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Abstract	  	  What	  factors	  influence	  migrants’	  decision	  to	  participate	  in	  home	  country	  elections?	  While	  existing	  literature	  on	  general	  voter	  turnout	  and	  turnout	  of	  minority	  and	  migrant	  voters	  has	  long	  attempted	   to	  explain	  why	  migrants	  become	   involved	   in	   the	  politics	   in	   their	  place	  of	  residence,	   little	   is	   known	   about	   what	   drives	   emigrants	   to	   vote	   in	   their	   home	   country	  elections	  from	  abroad.	  This	  paper	  builds	  up	  on	  this	  literature	  to	  determine	  what	  variables	  should	   be	   analyzed	   to	   understand	   the	   behavior	   of	   external	   voters,	   and	   also	   points	   out	  possible	  alternative	  variables.	  To	   support	   this	  discussion,	   the	  paper	   relies	  on	  analyses	  of	  four	  countries	  -­‐	  Italy,	  Belgium,	  Mexico	  and	  Bolivia	  -­‐	  that	  have	  implemented	  external	  voting	  mechanisms	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  	  	  
Introduction	  	  	  An	   increasing	  number	  of	  countries	  have	  recently	   implemented	  external	  voting	   legislation	  that	   allows	   citizens	   residing	   abroad	   to	   vote	   in	   home	   country	   elections.	   Despite	   the	  existence	  of	   a	  growing	   literature	  on	   state	  policies	   trying	   to	   reach	  out	   to	   citizens	   residing	  abroad,	   little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	   to	   the	  development	  of	  external	  voting.	  Very	   little	   is	  known	  of	  the	  motivations	  of	  states	  to	  extend	  voting	  to	  emigrants,	  or	  of	  the	  motivations	  of	  emigrants	  to	  take	  part	  in	  home	  country	  elections.	  What	  I	  will	  illustrate	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  state	  motivations	  and	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  are	  strongly	  related.	  Indeed,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  very	  process	  of	  adoption	  of	  external	  voting	   legislation	  strongly	  shapes	   the	  content	  of	   the	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legislation	  which,	  in	  turn,	  has	  a	  crucial	  impact	  on	  voter	  turnout.	  To	  support	  this	  point,	  I	  will	  first	  define	  the	  concept	  of	  external	  voting	  and	  discuss	  the	  difficulties	  related	  to	  measuring	  emigrant	   voter	   turnout.	   Second,	   I	   will	   review	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   voter	   turnout	   in	  general,	  and	  on	  minority	  and	  migrant	  origin	  voter	   in	  particular.	  Third,	  building	  up	  on	  the	  literature	   that	   tries	   to	   explain	   why	   migrants	   get	   involved	   in	   politics	   in	   their	   place	   of	  residence,	  I	  will	  examine	  in	  detail	  the	  situation	  of	  four	  countries	  -­‐	  Mexico,	  Bolivia,	  Italy	  and	  Belgium	  -­‐	   that	  have	   implemented	  external	  voting	  mechanisms	   in	  recent	  years.	   	  Analyzing	  their	  legislation	  and	  the	  means	  by	  which	  it	  was	  implemented	  in	  recent	  elections	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  determine,	  in	  the	  fourth	  and	  final	  part	  of	  the	  paper,	  which	  variables	  should	  be	  looked	  at	  to	  understand	  the	  behavior	  of	  external	  voters,	  	  and	  possible	  alternative	  variables	  in	  the	  turnout	  of	  emigrant	  voters.	  	  This	   paper	   relies	   on	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	   data	   collected	   from	   fieldwork	   between	  September	  2006	  and	  March	  2010.	   It	   relies	  on	  observations	  of	  electoral	  processes	  abroad	  through	   direct	   observation,	   analysis	   of	   legislative	   documents,	   election	   results,	   existing	  literature	   and	   press.	   For	   each	   country	   analyzed,	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   with	  government	  officials	  involved	  in	  electoral	  processes,	  elected	  officials,	  emigrant	  associations	  leaders	  and	  voters.	  	  	  
1.	  Defining	  external	  voting	  and	  apprehending	  voter	  turnout	  abroad	  	  In	  the	  fast	  growing	  literature	  on	  diasporic	  policy,	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  external	  voting.	   Existing	   literature	   largely	   approaches	   external	   voting	   mostly	   from	   a	   normative	  viewpoint	  (Barry,	  2006,	  Bauböck,	  2007,	  Blais	  et	  al.,	  2001,	  López-­‐Guerra,	  2005,	  Nohlen	  and	  Grotz,	   2000,	   Rubio-­‐Marín,	   2006).	   Over	   the	   last	   few	   years,	   several	   different	   comparative	  studies	  on	  external	  voting	  have	  attempted	   to	  make	  an	   inventory	  of	   the	  different	   systems	  and,	   in	   some	   cases,	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   relevant	  motivations	   of	   the	   state	   on	   the	   specific	  issue	  of	  external	  voting	  (Collyer	  and	  Vathi,	  2007,	  Gamlen,	  2006,	  IDEA,	  2007,	  Levitt	  and	  de	  la	   Dehesa,	   2003,	   Waterbury,	   2008).	   The	   recent	   literature	   has	   contributed	   to	   clarify	   the	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concept	   of	   external	   voting,	   to	   illustrate	   its	   different	   forms	   and	   to	   demonstrate	   that,	  contrary	  popular	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  a	  well	  established	  practice	  worldwide.	  	  	  
1.1	  The	  definition	  of	  external	  voting	  and	  its	  development	  	   	  A	  good	   introductory	  definition	  of	  external	  voting	   is	   that	  provided	  by	   the	   IDEA	  handbook	  (2007:	  8)	  which	  defines	   it	  as,	   “procedures	  which	  enable	  some	  or	  all	  electors	  of	  a	  country	  who	  are	  temporarily	  or	  permanently	  abroad	  to	  exercise	  their	  voting	  rights	  from	  outside	  the	  national	  territory.”	  External	  voting	  	  must	  therefore	  be	  differentiated	  from	  the	  franchise	  for	  foreigners	   in	   the	   host	   country	   and	   from	   the	   cases	   where	   emigrants	   are	   allowed	   to	  participate	  in	  elections	  in	  the	  home	  country,	  provided	  that	  they	  come	  back	  to	  the	  national	  territory	  to	  cast	  their	  vote	  on	  election	  day	  (even	  though	  this	  is	  also	  a	  mean	  for	  emigrants	  to	  have	  a	  direct	  say	  in	  homeland	  politics).	  	  	  As	  Nohlen	  and	  Grotz	  (2000),	  Collyer	  and	  Vathi	  (2007),	  and	  the	  IDEA	  handbook	  (2007)	  have	  shown,	   different	   forms	   of	   external	   voting	   co-­‐exist	   worldwide.	   These	   differences	   may	  concern,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  conditions	  of	  access	  to	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  (e.g.	  belonging	  to	  specific	   professional	   groups	   or	   not	   residing	   abroad	   for	  more	   than	   a	   specific	   period),	   the	  type	   of	   elections	   the	   emigrant	   is	   invited	   to	   vote	   in	   and,	   most	   importantly,	   the	   voting	  mechanisms	   in	   place	   for	   exercising	   the	   right	   to	   vote	   from	   abroad.	   Bauböck	   (2007)	  distinguishes	  five	  ways	  to	  cast	  a	  ballot	  outside	  the	  country:	  voting	  in	  person	  at	  embassies	  and	  consulates,	  voting	  in	  person	  at	  polling	  stations	  abroad,	  mail	  ballots,	  proxy	  voting	  and	  remote	  electronic	  voting.	  	  	  Despite	  these	  differences	  in	  levels	  of	  inclusion	  of	  the	  external	  electorate,	  and	  	  in	  the	  voting	  mechanisms,	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   comparative	   literature	   on	   external	   voting	   similarly	  notes	  a	  substantial	   increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  states	  allowing	  for	  external	  voting	  (in	  some	  form)	  over	   the	   last	  decades	  (Wucker,	  2004).	  Yet,	  Collyer	  and	  Vathi	   (2007)	  argue	  that	   the	  number	   of	   countries	   allowing	   external	   voting	   has	   been	   understated;	   including	   in	   recent	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literature.	   Their	   study,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   demonstrates	   that	   out	   of	   the	   144	   countries	  surveyed,	   115	   allowed	   for	   some	   form	   of	   external	   voting,	   leading	   them	   to	   conclude	   that	  external	  voting	  is	  actually	  the	  norm	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  The	  IDEA	  handbook	  (2007),	  however,	   tempers	   this	   estimation	   by	   noting	   the	   numerous	   limitations	   of	   access	   to	   the	  external	  voting	  procedure	  in	  various	  cases.	  It	  further	  stresses	  that,	  even	  within	  the	  group	  of	  approximately	  80	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  have	  specific	  restrictions	  on	  the	  entitlement	  to	  an	  external	   vote,	   other	   legal,	   technical,	   operational	   or	   administrative	   barriers	  may	   de	   facto	  restrict	  the	  ability	  to	  vote	  from	  abroad.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  existence	  of	  liberal	  and	  restrictive	  external	   voting	   regimes	   does	   not	   hide	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   number	   of	   states	   allowing	   some	  form	  of	  external	  voting	  has	  boomed.	  This	  confirms	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  have	  developed	  in	  these	  first	  paragraphs	  that	  home	  states	  are	  trying	  to	  tighten	  the	  links	  with	  their	  citizens	  abroad	  by	   increasing	   their	   ability	   to	   be	   politically	   active	   both	   in	   the	   home	   and	   the	   host	   state	  without	  having	  to	  choose	  (Bauböck,	  2003,	  Spiro,	  2006).	  	  
1.2	  Measuring	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  	  Because	   of	   the	   limited	   comparative	   literature	   available,	   little	   is	   also	   know	   on	   the	   actual	  interest	  of	  emigrants	  in	  voting	  in	  home	  country	  elections.	  From	  the	  IDEA	  handbook,	  we	  do	  know	   that	  emigrant	  voters	  usually	   represent	  a	   small	   share	  of	   the	   total	  voting	  population	  and	  that	  “rates	  of	  registration	  and	  turnout	  among	  external	  voters	  are	  almost	  always	  lower	  than	   they	   are	   in-­‐country”	   (2007:	   31).	   Even	   though	   we	   will	   see	   that	   different	   levels	   of	  participation	   are	   observed	   worldwide,	   Leticia	   Calderon	   Chelius	   (2003)	   draws	   a	   similar	  conclusion	  from	  her	  comparative	  book	  on	  external	  voting	   in	  different	  parts	  of	   the	  worlds	  stating	   that	   low	   turnout	   among	   external	   voters	   is	   usually	   the	   norm	   at	   the	   international	  level.	   Before	   we	   turn	   to	   the	   reasons	   explaining	   the	   apparent	   weak	   interest	   of	   emigrant	  voters	   in	   home	   country	   elections,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   discuss	  what	   is	  meant	   by	   the	   actual	  concept	  of	  voter	  turnout	  in	  general	  but	  also	  applied	  to	  external	  voters	  in	  particular.	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By	   definition,	   measuring	   voter	   turnout	   implies	   defining	   a	   ratio	   beforehand	   where	   the	  numerator	  and	  denominator	  are	  clearly	  defined.	  According	  to	  Geys	  (2006),	  there	  are	  three	  basic	   approaches	   to	  measuring	   voter	   turnout.	   The	   first	   requires	   dividing	   the	   number	   of	  voters	  by	  voting	  age.	  Second,	  voter	  turnout	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  division	  of	  voters	  who	  are	  actually	  eligible	  to	  vote	  (i.e.	  in	  most	  countries	  this	  would	  comprise	  the	  population	  above	  18	  years	   old	  who	   are	   not	   deprived	   of	   their	   citizenship	   rights).	   A	   third	   approach	   consists	   in	  dividing	   the	   number	   of	   voters	   by	   the	   number	   of	   registered	   voters	   (comprising	   the	  population	   eligible	   to	   vote	  who	  actually	   requested	   to	  be	   added	   to	   voter	   registries).	   Even	  though	  Geys	  (2006)underscores	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  specific	  method	  is	  often	  guided	  by	  the	  availability	   of	   data	   (a	   problem	   even	  more	   acute	   with	   emigrant	   voters),	   choosing	   one	   of	  these	  approaches	   instead	  of	   the	  other	  has	  clear	   implications	   in	   the	  assessment	  of	  voters’	  interest	  in	  participating	  in	  a	  specific	  election.	  	  	  Bearing	   in	   mind	   the	   different	   definitions	   of	   voter	   turnout	   presented	   above,	   defining	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  is	  even	  more	  complex	  because	  of	  the	  limited	  quantitative	  data	  that	  is	   usually	   available	   on	   emigrants.	   As	  most	   sending	   countries	   do	   not	   oblige	   emigrants	   to	  make	   a	   formal	   declaration	   when	   they	   are	   leaving	   (or	   cannot	   enforce	   the	   rule),	   the	  estimation	   of	   the	   total	   population	   of	   voting	   age	   abroad	   often	   relies	   on	   the	   voluntary	  registration	  of	  emigrants	  with	  consular	  authorities.	   In	  cases	  when	  emigrants	  do	  not	   trust	  homeland	  authorities	  or	  when	  they	  do	  not	  see	  a	  clear	  interest	  in	  registering	  with	  consular	  authorities,	  emigrant	  population	  registries	  may	  prove	  far	  from	  comprehensive.	  Similarly,	  in	  Italy,	   the	   existence	   of	   competing	   registries	   on	   the	   Italian	   population	   abroad	   held	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Interior	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   long	   created	   uncertainty	   with	  respect	  to	  the	  number	  of	  Italians	  residing	  abroad.	  	  Determining	  the	  population	  abroad	  who	  is	  eligible	  to	  vote	  is	  equally	  problematic.	  Verifying	  that	   emigrants	   are	   not	   deprived	   from	   civic	   rights	   in	   their	   home	   country	   requires	  coordination	  between	  home	   country	  ministries.	  As	  we	   shall	   see	  below,	  Mexico	  has	   faced	  particular	   difficulties	   in	   estimating	   the	   potential	   number	   of	   emigrant	   voters	   that	   would	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participate	  in	  the	  2006	  Presidential	  election.	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  task	  	  complex	  because	  a	  large	  portion	   of	   the	   Mexican	   population	   in	   the	   United	   States	   is	   undocumented,	   it	   was	   also	  impossible	  to	  determine	  the	  number	  of	  eligible	  voters	  because	  eligibility	  requires	  that	  the	  emigrant	  (like	  other	  Mexican	  citizens)	  to	  hold	  a	  voter	  identity	  card	  (credencial	  de	  elector)	  to	  be	  able	  to	  vote.	  	  	  The	  only	  way	  to	  measure	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  with	  greater	  accuracy	  is	  to	  compare	  the	  emigrant	  voting	  population	  with	  the	  emigrant	  population	  that	  is	  actually	  registered	  to	  vote	  
from	  abroad.	  This	  solution	  nonetheless	  creates	  two	  issues	  when	  trying	  to	  use	  voter	  turnout	  as	   an	   indicator	   for	   emigrants’	   interest	   in	  participating	   to	  home	  country	  elections.	  On	   the	  one	   hand,	   similarly	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   non-­‐emigrant	   voters,	   in	   countries	  where	   voting	   is	  obligatory	   (even	   abroad)	   and	  migrants	   can	  be	   fined	   if	   they	  do	  not	   vote,	   registration	   and	  participation	  do	  not	  necessarily	  indicate	  migrants’	  interest	  in	  participating	  in	  home	  country	  elections.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  countries	  who	  have	  restrictive	  legislation	  on	  external	  voting	  (e.g.	   complex	  procedural	   requirements	   to	   register	   or	   vote)	  may	  have	  high	   voter	   turnout,	  which	  nonetheless	  reflects	  a	  very	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  total	  emigrant	  population	  of	  voting	  age.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Mexico,	  where	  although	  the	  entire	  emigrant	  population	  of	  voting	  age	  is	  estimated	  in	  the	  several	  millions,	  only	  40,000	  emigrants	  were	  actually	  registered	  to	  vote	  in	   the	   last	   Presidential	   election.	   Though	   80	   %	   of	   the	   registered	   population	   voted	  (technically	  reflecting	  high	  voter	  turnout),	  this	  number	  is	  marginal	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  total	   potential	   pool	   of	   emigrant	   voters	   For	   this	   reason,	   I	   argue	   in	   favor	   of	   comparing	  different	  indicators	  on	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout,	  even	  when	  data	  on	  the	  population	  of	  voting	  age	   and	   the	   population	   eligible	   to	   vote	   abroad	   are	   estimated.	   In	   this	   sense,	   measuring	  emigrant	  voter	   turnout	   is	  a	   trade-­‐off	  between	  accuracy	  of	   the	  data	  and	   the	  pertinence	  of	  the	  conclusion	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  it.	  	  
1.3	  Evaluating	  migrant	  interest	  and	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  electoral	  processes	  abroad	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As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   case	   studies,	   external	   voting	   is	   often	   a	   controversial	   topic	   in	   the	  countries	  that	  allow	  it	  and	  turnout	  figurers	  can	  therefore	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  survival	  of	  these	  electoral	  mechanisms	  (i.e.	  low	  turnout	  abroad	  often	  leading	  to	  criticism	  on	  the	  lack	  of	   interest	   of	  migrants	   for	   home	   country	   politics)	   but	   also,	   and	  most	   importantly,	   in	   the	  relations	  between	  emigrants	  and	  the	  home	  country.	  Indeed,	  when	  authorities	  adopt	  a	  very	  restrictive	   legislation	   on	   external	   voting,	   migrants	   could	   deduct	   from	   that	   that	   home	  country	   authorities	   are	   not	   concerned	   with	   their	   population	   abroad.	   Accordingly,	   the	  indicators	  that	  are	  used	  to	  measure	  success	  or	  failure	  are	  of	  critical	  political	  importance.	  	  	  I	   identify	   three	   different	   ways	   of	   evaluating	   electoral	   processes	   abroad	   and	   assessing	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  interest	  in	  participating	  to	  home	  country	  elections:	  one	  way	  consists	   in	  measuring	  emigrant	  voter	   turnout	  compared	  to	  resident	  voter	   turnout	  at	  the	   same	   election,	   while	   the	   other	   two	   measure	   emigrant	   voter	   turnout	   from	   an	  international	  perspective.	  	  	  The	  first	  way	  by	  which	  measuring	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  abroad	  proves	  complex	  is	  in	  its	  comparison	   to	   non-­‐emigrant	   voter	   turnout	   in	   the	   same	   election.	   Comparing	   these	   two	  figures	  appears,	  at	  the	  first	  sight,	  as	  a	  sensible	  way	  of	  measuring	  the	  impact	  of	  emigration	  on	   the	   citizens’	   interest	   in	   voting	   in	   home	   country	   elections.	   However,	   this	   viewpoint	  neglects	   the	   reality	   that	   external	   voting	   is	   regulated	   by	   ad-­‐hoc	   pieces	   of	   legislation	   that	  often	  do	  not	  permit	  emigrants	  to	  register	  or	  vote	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  non-­‐emigrant	  voters.	  In	  Belgium	  for	   instance,	  voting	  is	  mandatory	  for	  residents	  and	  Belgians	  abroad,	  but	  voter	  registration	   is	   automatic	   for	   residents	   only	   (i.e.	   non-­‐migrants	   receive	   their	   invitations	   to	  vote	  directly	  at	  home).	  Belgian	  emigrants,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  must	  request	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  voter	  registry	  at	  their	  consulate	  before	  each	  election.	  	  Comparing	  levels	  of	  participation	  of	  different	   kinds	   of	   electors	   at	   the	   same	   election	   can	   therefore	   prove	   unfitting	   when	   all	  electors	  do	  not	  access	  their	  right	  to	  vote	  under	  the	  same	  rules.	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The	   second	   level	   way	   by	   which	   emigrant	   voter	   turnout	   can	   be	   evaluated	   is	   through	  international	   comparison.	  Two	  options	  are	  available	  here.	  On	  one	  hand,	  we	  can	  compare	  (when	   data	   is	   available)	   emigrant	   voter	   turnout	   of	   the	   same	   emigrant	   national	   group	  residing	   in	   different	   countries	   of	   settlement	   (e.g.	   comparing	   voter	   turnout	   of	   Italians	   in	  Germany	  with	  that	  of	  Italians	  in	  Argentina).	  Doing	  so	  may	  help	  us	  identify	  the	  influence	  of	  the	   countries	   of	   residence	   in	   the	   migrants’	   interest	   in	   participating	   in	   home	   country	  elections.	  In	  that	  sense,	  such	  comparison	  would	  address	  one	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  Waldinger	  and	   Fitzgerald	   (2004)	   on	   the	   existing	   research	   on	   immigrant	   transnational	   practices	   by	  comparing	  the	  level	  of	  transnational	  involvement	  of	  migrants	  from	  the	  same	  national	  group	  in	  different	  receiving	  countries.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  international	  comparison	  can	  also	  mean	  comparing	  emigrant	  voter	   turnout	  between	  different	  countries	   that	  allow	  external	  voting	  (e.g.	   comparing	   voter	   turnout	   of	   Belgians	   abroad	   at	   Federal	   legislative	   elections	   with	  turnout	   of	   Bolivians	   abroad	   at	   Presidential	   elections).	   Here	   again,	   comparisons	   may	   be	  limited	   in	   two	   regards.	   First,	   comparing	   emigrant	   voter	   turnout	   at	   elections	   that	   do	   not	  concern	   the	   same	   level	   of	   power	   (e.g.	   presidential	   and	   legislative	   elections)	   neglects	   the	  fact	   that	   some	   elections	  may	   be	  more	   relevant	   than	   others	   to	   emigrant	   voters	   and	   non-­‐emigrant	  voters	  alike.	   Second,	   as	   I	   already	  mentioned,	   the	  different	   legislation	  governing	  external	  voting	  in	  the	  countries	  that	  allow	  it	  have	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  voter	  turnout.	  This	  is	  one	  the	  recurring	  point	  that	  I	  will	  make	  in	  the	  different	  case	  studies	  under	  scrutiny.	  	  	  	  Now	   that	   we	   have	   discussed	   the	   use	   of	   voter	   turnout	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   measuring	   migrants’	  interest	   in	  participating	   to	  home	  country	  elections,	  we	  can	   turn	   to	   the	  existing	   literature	  explaining	   variations	   in	   general	   voter	   turnout	   and	   the	   turnout	   of	   migrant	   voters	   in	   the	  elections	   of	   their	   countries	   of	   settlement.	   Again,	   I	   discuss	   how	   relevant	   the	   existant	  literature	  is	  to	  explain	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout.	  	  	  	  
2.	  How	  can	  we	  explain	  the	  global	  trend	  towards	  low	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout?	  A	  view	  
from	  existing	  literature	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  I	  mentioned	  earlier	  that	   the	  existing	   literature	  on	  external	  voting	  underlines	  the	   fact	   that	  low	   emigrant	   voter	   turnout	   is	   a	   general	   trend	   across	   countries	   allowing	   external	   voting,	  and	  also	  that	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  is	  generally	  lower	  than	  resident	  voter	  turnout.	  In	  this	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  will	  look	  at	  established	  variables	  explaining	  general	  voter	  turnout	  as	  defined	  by	  Geys	  (2006).	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  specific	   literature	  on	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout,	   I	  attempt	  to	  refine	  those	  variables	  with	  existing	  literature	  on	  voter	  turnout	  of	  emigrants	  in	  host	  country	  elections.	  Despite	  its	  lack	  of	  focus	  on	  home	  country	  politics,	  the	  literature	  has	  the	   advantage	   of	   underlining	   variables	   that	   are	   specific	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   migrants	   in	  relation	  with	  political	  participation.	  In	  addition,	  I	  refine	  those	  variables	  to	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  external	  voting.	  Altogether,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  combined	  effort	  is	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  list	  of	  indicators	  that	  will	  be	  used	  help	  find	  relevant	  variables	  on	  external	  voter	  turnout	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  4	  case	  studies	  below.	  	  	  Here	   again,	  we	   rely	  mostly	   on	   Geys’s	   comparative	  work	   (2006),	  which	   reviewed	   a	   large	  number	  of	  studies	  on	  voter	   turnout	  and	  established	  a	   list	  of	  variables	  he	  classified	  under	  three	   categories,	  which	   underwent	   statistical	   analysis	   to	   determine	  whether	   or	   not	   they	  effectively	  explained	  voter	  turnout	  in	  existing	  studies	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  	  2.1	  Demographic	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  variables	  	  Under	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   category,	   Geys	   lists	   different	   variables	   that	   concern	   the	  demographics	  of	  the	  voting	  population.	  The	  two	  variables	  that	  Geys	  identifies	  as	  relevant	  in	  the	   studies	   he	   covered	   are	   population	   size	   and	   population	   stability.	   The	   population	   size	  variable	  postulates	  that	  the	  smaller	  the	  size	  of	  the	  electoral	  district,	  the	  higher	  the	  incentive	  to	   vote	   due	   to	   a	   higher	   probability	   to	   influence	   electoral	   results	  with	   an	   individual	   vote.	  
Population	   stability,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   shows	   a	   positive	   correlation	   between	   length	   of	  residence	   in	  an	  area	  and	  the	   likelihood	  to	  vote	   in	  elections	  happening	  in	  that	  area.	   In	  the	  literature	  on	  migrant	  voter	  turnout	  in	  host	  country	  elections,	  a	  similar	  argument	  has	  been	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made	  by	  Messina	  (2006)who	  found	  that	  the	  duration	  of	  residence	  in	  the	  country	  positively	  influences	  immigrant	  voter	  turnout.	  A	  further	  relevant	  variable	  under	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  category	   is	   previous	   turnout,	   which	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   previous	   participation	   in	  elections	   increases	   the	   likelihood	  of	  participating	   in	   future	  elections.	  Two	  other	  variables	  that	  Geys	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  did	  not	  show	  positive	  correlation	  in	  the	  electoral	  studies	  he	   reviewed.	   This	   first	   is	   population	   concentration,	   which	   proposes	   that	   both	   social	  pressure	   to	  vote	  and	   the	  knowledge	  of	  candidates	  are	   lower	   in	  urban	  areas	   than	   in	  rural	  areas.	  Population	  homogeneity	  is	  the	  second	  variable	  that	  Geys	  did	  not	  find	  to	  be	  supported	  in	   existing	   studies.	   This	   term	   can	   be	   interpreted	   in	   two	   ways.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   racial	   or	   ethnic	   heterogeneity	   could	   be	   said	   of	   weakening	   cohesion	   and	  therefore	   undermining	   cohesion	   and	   social	   pressure	   to	   vote.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  heterogeneity	   could	   increase	   turnout	   when	   governments	   are	   performing	   redistributive	  roles	  by	  which	  the	  most	  politically	  powerful	  groups	  receive	  the	  largest	  benefits.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  literature	  on	  immigrant	  voter	  turnout	  in	  host	  country	  elections	  allows	  me	  to	  refine	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  socio-­‐economic	  variables.	  As	  Bevelander	  and	  Pendakur	  (2009)	  show	   in	   their	   review	   of	   the	   literature,	   different	   approaches	   predominate	   in	   Europe	   and	  North	   America	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   relevance	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   variables	   for	   immigrant	  voter	   turnout.	   In	   Europe,	   an	   important	   number	   of	   studies	   followed	  Fennema	   and	  Tillie’s	  work	   (1999)	   on	   social	   capital.	   According	   to	   these	   two	   scholars,	   greater	   involvement	   of	  migrants	   in	  ethnic	  associations	  (used	  to	  measure	   levels	  of	  social	  capital),	   leads	  to	  greater	  trust	   in	  host	  country	   institutions.	  Higher	   levels	  of	  voter	  turnout	   is	   thus	   likely	  to	  be	  found	  within	  this	  migrant	  community.	  Applied	  to	  different	  migrant	  communities	  in	  different	  parts	  of	   Europe,	   this	   assertion	   has	   been	   consistently	   confirmed	   (Togeby,	   2004,	   Berger	   et	   al.,	  2004,	   Jacobs	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   In	  North	  America,	   Bevelander	   and	  Pendakur	   (2009)	   postulate	  that	   research	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   relation	   between	   human	   capital	   and	   voting	   so	   far.	  Research	   thus	   focuses	   on	   demographic	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   variables	   (age,	   education,	  occupation)	   as	   factors	   explaining	   lower	   turnout	   among	   minorities	   (Tuckel	   and	   Maisel,	  1994,	   DeSipio,	   1996).	   In	   their	   analysis	   of	   immigrant	   behavior	   in	   Canadian	   elections,	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Bevelander	   and	   Pendakur	   nonetheless	   attempt	   to	   broaden	   the	   scope	   of	   analysis	   by	  concluding	   that,	   “it	   is	   not	  minority	   status	   driving	   [immigrant]	   voter	   turnout.	   Rather	   it	   is	  largely	   the	   combination	  of	   demographic,	   socioeconomic	   and	   social	   capital	   attributes	   that	  explains	  voter	  turnout”	  (2009:	  1420).	  	  2.2	  Political	  variables	  	  The	  second	  type	  of	  variables	  identified	  by	  Geys	  in	  the	  voter	  turnout	  literature	  are	  those	  of	  political	   nature	   -­‐	   consisting	  of	   three	  different	   indicators.	  This	   first	   one	   is	   closeness	   of	   the	  
election,	   which	   	   refers	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   when	   elections	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   narrow,	   the	  perceived	  utility	  of	  each	  individual	  vote	   is	  higher	  and,	  accordingly,	   turnout	   is	  also	  higher.	  Second,	   campaign	   spending	   is	   a	   political	   variable	   that	   Geys	   has	   found	   to	   strongly	   affect	  voter	   turnout	   in	   existing	   studies.	   Despite	   the	   potential	   distrust	   towards	   politics	   that	  negative	  campaigning	  could	  create,	  Geys	  (2006:	  648)	  concludes	  that	  “[electoral]	  campaigns	  increase	  information	  and	  awareness	  levels	  within	  the	  electorate	  and	  decrease	  the	  costs	  of	  information	   acquisition.”	   Third,	   political	   fragmentation,	   or	   the	   number	   of	   parties	  participating	  in	  the	  election,	  seems	  to	  yield	  different	  results	  according	  to	  existing	  studies.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  existence	  of	  multiple	  political	  parties	  may	  increase	  voter	  awareness,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  voter	  will	   identify	  with	  a	  party’s	  political	  platform.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  elections	  in	  which	  many	  parties	  take	  part	  often	  mean	  that	  coalitions	  will	  exist	  after	   the	  election.	  This,	   in	   turn,	  decreases	  voters’	   influence	   in	   the	  choice	  of	   the	  governing	  majority.	  	  	  The	  literature	  on	  migrant	  voter	  turnout	  in	  host	  country	  elections	  point	  to	  another	  political	  variable	   that	  was	  mentioned	   in	   the	   discussion	   on	   social	   capital:	   trust	   in	   institutions.	   For	  Fennema	  and	  Tillie	  (1999),	  trust	  is	  believed	  derivative	  from	  involvement	  in	  migrant	  ethnic	  associations.	  Ramakrishnan	  and	  Espenshade	  (2001)	  also	  found	  that	  coming	  from	  a	  country	  that	  has	  a	  repressive	  political	  regime	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  migrant	  voter	  turnout	  in	  host	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country	   elections.	   This	   element	   certainly	   deserves	   more	   attention	   in	   our	   discussion	   on	  external	  voter	  turnout	  variables.	  	  2.3	  Institutional	  variables	  	  In	   addition	   to	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   political	   variables,	   literature	   on	   voter	   turnout	   has	  pointed	  to	  	  a	  series	  of	  electoral	  procedures	  governing	  the	  elections	  that	  can	  strongly	  affect	  participation.	   I	   will	   devote	   significant	   attention	   to	   one	   procedure	   in	   my	   analysis:	  
registration	   requirements.	   As	   underlined	  by	  Geys	   (2006),	   there	   is	   substantial	   evidence	   in	  literature	   that	   more	   complex	   registration	   procedures	   increase	   the	   information	   and	  monetary	  costs	  of	  voting.	  Indeed,	  compared	  to	  automatic	  registration,	  complex	  registration	  procedures	  require	  voters	  to	  acquire	  necessary	  information	  and	  to	  take	  the	  necessary	  time	  off	  other	  activities	  to	  register.	  A	  second	  institutional	  variable	  is	  the	  electoral	  system	  which	  appear	  to	  have	  significant	  influence	  as	  more	  proportional	  systems	  generally	  increase	  voter	  turnout	   (cf.	   discussion	   on	   political	   fragmentation).	   In	   the	   case	   external	   voting,	   attention	  must	  also	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  particularity	  of	  countries	  like	  Italy,	  in	  which	  emigrant	  voters	  elect	  specific	  lawmakers	  who	  directly	  represent	  them	  in	  Parliament.	  The	  third	  and	  most	  obvious	  institutional	   variable	   is	   compulsory	   voting	   which	   unsurprisingly	   always	   leads	   to	   higher	  voter	  turnout	  in	  countries	  that	  adopt	  it.	  With	  the	  case	  of	  Belgium,	  however,	  I	  will	  illustrate	  that	   the	   effect	   of	   compulsory	   voting	   abroad	   is	   not	   so	   easy	   to	   apprehend.	   The	   last	  institutional	  variable	  is	  the	  influence	  of	  concurrent	  elections	  on	  turnout,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  presence	  of	  other	  elections	  on	  the	  ballot	  increases	  media	  attention	  and	  voter	  awareness	  while	  decreasing	  the	  cost	  of	  voting.	  	  	  	  
3.	   Identifying	   relevant	   variables	   to	   analyze	   external	   voter	   turnout	   through	   case	  
studies	  	  How	  do	   the	  variables	  presented	  above	  apply	   to	  external	  voter	   turnout?	   In	   this	   section	  of	  the	  paper,	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  some	  variables	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  relevant	  than	  others	  in	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the	  case	  of	  external	  voting.	  I	  also	  underline	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  variables	  ought	  to	  be	  adapted	  for	   the	   analysis	   of	   external	   voter	   turnout.	   I	   subsequently	   proceed	   to	   the	   choice	   of	   case	  studies,	  which	  serve	  to	  test	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  variables.	  	  A	   serious	   issue	   in	   the	   choice	   of	   case	   studies	   is	   that	   demographic	   and	   socioeconomic	  variables	  very	  much	  blur	  the	  picture.	  Indeed,	  since	  most	  emigrant	  sending	  countries	  have	  an	   emigrant	   population	   that	   is	   spread	   in	   different	   countries	   (N.B.	   Mexico	   would	   be	   an	  exception	  in	  that	  sense),	  identifying	  a	  common	  demographic	  and	  socioeconomic	  profile	  for	  all	   external	  voters	  proceeding	   from	   the	   same	  country	  of	  origin	   is	  hardly	  possible.	  This	   is	  because	   the	  different	  countries	  of	  destination	  are	  most	   likely	   to	  attract	  different	  kinds	  of	  migrants,	  at	  different	  periods,	  and	  with	  different	  socioeconomic	  profiles.	  Further,	  different	  contexts	  of	  migration	  and	  settlement	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  voter	  turnout.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  exclude	  these	  variables	  from	  my	  analysis.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  significant	  attention	  will	  be	  devoted	  to	  stress	  differences	  in	  the	  turnout	  of	  migrants	  of	  the	  same	  national	  origin	  who	  have	  settled	  in	  different	  countries.	  	  For	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   case	   studies,	   I	   have	   however	   decided	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   two	   other	  variables	   that	   are	   the	   institutional	   and	   political	   variables.	   I	   hypothesize	   that	   the	  institutional	  variable	  –	  primarily	  registration	  rules	  -­‐	  most	  affect	  emigrant	  voters	  because,	  as	  I	   argue	   elsewhere	   (Lafleur,	   forthcoming),	   controlling	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   electoral	   body	  abroad	  is	  the	  prime	  concern	  of	  political	  parties	  negotiating	  the	  adoption	  of	  external	  voting	  laws.	   	   The	   electoral	   system	   abroad	   is	   a	   second	   variable	   that	   I	   consider	   to	   be	   capable	   of	  influencing	  voter	  turnout.	  Indeed,	  external	  voting	  legislation	  often	  does	  not	  provide	  for	  the	  right	  to	  vote	   in	  similar	  kind	  of	  elections	   from	  one	  country	  to	  the	  next.	  Even	  though	  some	  countries	   have	   provisions	   for	   external	   voting	   at	   the	   referenda,	   regional	   elections	   (e.g.	  Mexico’s	   state	   of	   Michoacán),	   and	   supranational	   elections	   (e.g.	   European	   Parliament	  elections	   or	   the	   election	   of	   Colombian	   representatives	   at	   the	   Andean	   Parliament),	  presidential	  and	  legislative	  elections	  are	  the	  most	  common	  elections	  which	  emigrants	  are	  able	  to	  vote.	  The	  different	  types	  of	  elections	  and	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  external	  votes	  are	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counted	   (e.g.	   extra-­‐territorial	   with	   direct	   representation	   of	   emigrants	   in	   Parliament	   for	  Italians	   abroad)	   are	   criteria	  worth	   taking	   in	   consideration.	  As	  most	   countries	   only	   allow	  emigrants	   to	   vote	   in	   one	   type	   of	   election,	   the	   role	   of	   concurrent	   elections	   was	   not	  considered	  in	  the	  choice	  of	  case	  studies.	  	  	  With	  regard	  to	  political	  variables,	   I	  have	   largely	   focused	  on	  the	  role	  of	  political	  parties.	   In	  choosing	  case	  studies,	  I	  have	  approached	  the	  capacity	  of	  parties	  to	  convince	  citizens	  abroad	  to	  vote	  in	  two	  ways:	  their	  presence	  in	  countries	  of	  residence,	  and	  their	  involvement	  abroad	  during	  the	  electoral	  campaign.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  role	  of	  political	  parties,	  election	  closeness	  is	  considered	  an	  important	  variable	  in	  voter	  participation.	  The	  closer	  the	  election,	  the	  more	  concerned	   the	  emigrant	   is	   likely	   to	  be.	   I	  assume	   this	  phenomenon	  applies	  comparably	   to	  resident	  voters	  as	  external	  voters.	  	  
	   Institutional	  Variables	   Political	  Variables	  	  Easy	  registration	  procedure	  	   Strong	  campaigning	  abroad	  	  Direct	   representation	   of	   emigrants	   in	  Parliament	   (extra-­‐territorial	  constituency)	  	  
Strong	  presence	  of	  political	  parties	  abroad	  
Italy	  	  
+	  +	  
Right	   to	  vote	  at	   legislative	  elections	  and	  some	   referendums	   but	   not	   on	   the	   same	  day	   Close	  elections	  (2006)	  	  Easy	  registration	  procedure	  	   Weak	  presence	  of	  political	  parties	  abroad	  	  Vote	   at	   legislative	   elections	   in	   the	  Belgian	  electoral	  district	  of	  their	  choice	   Weak	  campaigning	  abroad	  
Belgium	  	  
+	  -­	  	  
No	  concurrent	  elections	  possible	   No	  close	  elections	  Restrictive	  registration	  procedure	   Strong	   presence	   of	   political	   parties	   abroad	  (USA)	  Vote	  at	  Presidential	  elections	   Campaigning	  abroad	  is	  prohibited	  by	  Law	  Mexico	  	  -­	  +	   No	  concurrent	  elections	  possible	   Close	  election	  Restrictive	  registration	  procedure	   Presence	   of	   political	   parties	   abroad	   is	   new	  and	   variable	   according	   to	   countries	   of	  destination	  Vote	  at	  presidential	  elections	  only	   Weak	  campaigning	  
Bolivia	  	  
-­	  -­	  
No	  concurrent	  elections	  possible	   No	  close	  election	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3.1	  Italy	  	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   external	   voting	   had	   been	   on	   the	   Italian	   Parliament’s	  agenda	   for	   the	   greater	   part	   of	   the	   20th	   Century	   and	   that	   Italians	   abroad	   had	   long	   been	  allowed	   to	   come	   to	   back	   to	   vote	   in	   Italy	   on	   Election	  Day,	   external	   voting	   only	   became	   a	  reality	  after	  a	  reform	  to	  the	  constitution	  in	  1999	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  law	  of	  application,	  Law	  No.	  459,	  on	  December	  27,	  2001.	  	  	  With	   this	   law,	   all	   Italian	   citizens	   residing	   abroad	   (and	   complying	   with	   the	   legal	  requirements	  applying	  to	  all	  citizens)	  have	  the	  to	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  vote	  by	  mail	  to	  the	  elections	  of	  both	  Chambers	  and	  referenda.	  Also,	  the	  vote	  of	  Italians	  abroad	  is	  automatic:	  voters	   receive	   at	   home	   an	   electoral	   package	   containing	   the	   ballot	   (without	   having	   to	  request	  it	  beforehand).	  	  Another	   important	   element	   of	   the	   law	   is	   the	   creation	   of	   four	   geographical	   sectors	  (repartizioni)	   within	   the	   foreign	   constituency:	   Europe,	   South	   America,	   Northern	   and	  Central	  America,	  and	  Africa,	  Asia,	  Oceania	  and	  Antarctica.	  In	  these	  sectors,	  candidates	  -­‐who	  must	  themselves	  be	  Italians	  abroad-­‐	  compete	  for	  12	  seats	  of	  senators	  and	  6	  of	  MPs.	  	  	  The	  first	  exercises	  of	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  from	  abroad	  have	  not	  been	  for	  legislative	  elections	  but	  rather	   for	  referenda	  the	  15th	   June	  2003	  (on	   labor	  and	   land	  settlement	   issues)	  and	  12	  and	   13th	   June	   2005	   (on	   the	   possibility	   to	   lift	   the	   limitations	   to	   the	   research	   on	   human	  embryos)3.	   2,206,875	   electoral	   packages	  were	   sent	   in	   2003	   of	  which	   10%	  were	   actually	  never	   delivered.	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   questions	   do	   not	   relate	   very	   much	   to	   the	  emigrants’	   interests,	   the	   participation	   rate	   was	   roughly	   similar	   to	   that	   observed	   on	   the	  national	   territory	   (25,7%	   in	   Italy	  and	  21.8%	  abroad).	   In	  2005,	  with	  a	   referendum	  asking	  more	   sensitive	   ethical	   questions,	   19%	   of	   voters	   abroad	   used	   their	   right	   while	   25.9%	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Both referenda were declared invalid for lack of participation.  
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Italian	   residents	   Italy	   did	   so	   (with	   differences	   between	   South	   America	   and	   Europe	  confirmed).	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	   overall	   results	   went	   in	   the	   same	   direction	   at	   home	   and	  abroad.	  	  	  Shortly	  after	  the	  second	  referendum,	  the	  institutional	  preparation	  for	  the	  first	  experience	  of	   external	   voting	   at	   legislative	   elections	   started	   in	   Italy	   by	   launching	   an	   information	  campaign	  abroad	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  a	  massive	  mailing	  campaign	  asking	  unregistered	  Italians	  abroad	  to	  confirm,	  correct	  and	  complement	  the	  information	  already	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  authorities.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  institutional	  preparation	  discussed	  above,	  political	  parties	  also	  designed	  their	   own	   campaigns	   to	   attract	   electors	   abroad.	   By	   organizing	   primaries	   in	   20	   countries	  abroad	   and	   looking	   for	   the	   support	   of	   sister	   parties	   in	   Italian	   emigrants’	   countries	   of	  residence,	  the	  Unione	  list	  led	  by	  Romano	  Prodi	  paid	  more	  attention	  to	  external	  voters	  than	  the	  Casa	  delle	  Libertà	  led	  by	  Silvio	  Berlusconi.	  The	  centre-­‐right	  coalition	  Casa	  delle	  Libertà,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  did	  not	  to	  come	  up	  with	  unique	  lists	  abroad	  as	  it	  did	  at	  home4.	  Also,	  it	  thought	  that	  the	  new	  proportional	  system	  with	  thresholds	  and	  a	  majority	  premium	  for	  the	  winner	  would	  ensure	  its	  victory	  in	  Italy.	  Finally,	  it	  gave	  almost	  no	  support	  to	  its	  candidates	  abroad.	  	  One	   of	   the	  major	   achievements	   of	   this	   first	   attempt	   at	   external	   voting	   for	   parliamentary	  elections	   is	   its	   relatively	  high	  participation	   rate	   of	   38.93%	   (N	  actual	   voters/N	   registered	  voters)	   compared	   with	   other	   countries	   allowing	   this	   form	   of	   suffrage.	   Even	   though	  emigrants	   and	   citizens	   residing	   in	   Italy	  were	   equally	   uninterested	   in	   participating	   in	   the	  last	  two	  referenda,	  Italian	  residents	  unsurprisingly	  mobilized	  much	  more	  for	  the	  legislative	  elections	  (81.4%).	  Also,	  all	  communities	  were	  not	  equally	  participative.	  Italian	  residents	  in	  South	  America	   -­‐especially	   the	  Argentines-­‐	  mobilized	  more	   than	  other	  voters,	  particularly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Alleanza Nazionale’s intimate conviction was that Italians abroad would favor them over any other right-
wing movement. 
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the	   European	   residents	   (with	   the	   notable	   exception	   of	   Switzerland).	   Europe	   however	  remained	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  electoral	  sector	  in	  absolute	  terms.	  	  	  Table	  1.	  Participation	  to	  the	  2006	  elections	  abroad	  (House	  of	  representatives)	  
Repartition	   Ballot	  sent	  to	  voters	  
abroad	  
Ballot	   sent	   back	   by	  
voter	   to	   consular	  
authorities	  
Turnout	   (Ballot	  
sent	   back	   by	   voters	  
in	  %)	  Asia,	   Africa,	  Oceania	   &	  Antartica	   152,068	   60,599	   39.85	  Northern	   and	  central	  America	   282,249	   97,943	   34.70	  South	  America	   693,522	   326,003	   47.01	  Europe	   1,579,543	   569,319	   36.04	  TOTAL	   2,707,382	   1,053,864	   38.93	  Sources:	  (Ministero	  dell'Interno,	  2006)	  	  Table	  2.	  Most	  participative	  countries	  of	  residence	  (House	  of	  representatives)	  
Country	  	   Ballot	   sent	  
back	   by	  
voter	   to	  
consular	  
authorities	  
Ballot	   sent	  
back	   by	  
voter	  (%)	  
Country	   Ballot	   sent	  
back	   by	  
voter	   to	  
consular	  
authorities	  
Ballot	   sent	  
back	   by	  
voter	  (%)	  
Argentina	   180,900	   50.59	   Venezuela	   28,589	   46.26	  Switzerland	   179,846	   48.16	   Uruguay	   28,271	   60.86	  Germany	   143,526	   33.29	   Spain	   12,234	   25.05	  France	   84,535	   30.33	   Peru	   7,681	   46.81	  Brazil	   67,834	   40.67	   Netherlands	   7,633	   34.61	  Belgium	   56,198	   30.20	   Luxemburg	   6,669	   39.67	  USA	   51,091	   30.71	   South	  Africa	   6,622	   31.20	  UK	   41,231	   30.58	   Chile	   5,799	   21.53	  Canada	   40,306	   40.46	   Austria	   4,346	   43.52	  Australia	   34,808	   36.82	   Croatia	   4,031	   59.59	  Sources:	  Ministero	  dell’Interno	  (2006)	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  In	  analyzing	  the	  results	  of	  the	  elections,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  Unione’s	  strategy	  has	  paid	  off.	  Indeed,	  after	  the	  election,	  the	  Unione	  occupies	  6	  of	  the	  12	  reserved	  seats	  in	  the	  House	  (plus	   one	   seat	   to	   the	   candidate	   of	   Italia	   dei	   Valori,	   a	   party	   that	   supports	   the	   centre-­‐left	  majority)	  and	  4	  of	  the	  6	  seats	  in	  the	  Senate.	  Forza	  Italia,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  only	  managed	  to	  get	  three	  MPs	  and	  one	  senator,	  while	  Alleanza	  Nazionale	  (Tremaglia	  list)	  has	  only	  one	  MP.	  Except	   for	   the	   European	   sector	   where	   the	   centre-­‐left	   coalition’s	   victory	   is	   blatant,	   its	  superior	   performances	   to	   those	   of	   the	   centre-­‐right	   in	   other	   geographical	   sectors	   appear	  largely	  due	   to	   the	  division	  of	   centre-­‐right	   lists	  abroad	   (as	   the	  2008	  elections	  would	   later	  confirm).	  	  	  In	  Argentina,	  the	  independent	  list	  of	  the	  charismatic	  millionaire	  Pallaro	  (originally	  close	  to	  Forza	   Italia)	   further	   split	   the	   forces	   of	   the	   centre-­‐right.	   	  More	   interesting	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  Senator	  Pallaro	  eventually	  decided	  to	  support	  Prodi’s	  coalition	  and	  gave	  him	  the	  necessary	  Senate	  seat	  to	  back	  up	  his	  parliamentary	  majority.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  foreign	  constituency	  –that	  was	  created	  to	  prevent	  external	  voters	   from	  deciding	  the	  election-­‐	   failed	  to	  reach	   its	  goal.	   This	   peculiar	   situation	   led	   to	   bitter	   criticism	   among	   right-­‐wing	   leaders	   who	  repeatedly	  questioned	  the	  validity	  of	  elections	  abroad	  (The	  Advertiser,	  2006,	  Fondazione	  Migrantes,	   2006).	   As	   the	   2008	   elections	   would	   confirm,	   Italy’s	   liberal	   law	   on	   external	  voting	   would	   also	   imply	   far	   more	   accusations	   of	   fraud	   abroad	   than	   more	   restrictive	  legislation	  of	  other	  countries.	  	  Table	  3.	  Elections	  Results	  	  Sector	  Africa,	  Asia,	  Oceania	  and	  Antarctica	  House	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Senate	  List	   N	  votes	   %	   of	  votes	   seats	   N	  votes	   %	  of	  votes	   seats	  Unione	   26,164	   47.52	   1	   23,067	   45.47	   1	  Forza	  Italia	   21,506	   39.06	   0	   18,383	   36.24	   0	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Per	   Italia	   nel	  mondo-­‐	  Tremaglia	   5,730	   10.41	   0	   4,845	   9.55	   0	  	  Sector	  Northern	  and	  Central	  America	  House	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Senate	  List	   N	  votes	   %	   of	  votes	   seats	   N	  votes	   %	  of	  votes	   seats	  Unione	   33,881	   38.72	   1	   32,036	   38.03	   1	  Forza	  Italia	   26,843	   30.68	   1	   25,556	   30.33	   0	  Per	   Italia	   nel	  mondo-­‐	  Tremaglia	   10,897	   12.45	   0	   11,604	   13.77	   0	  Udc	   9,494	   10.85	   0	   9,412	   11.17	   0	  	  Sector	  South	  America	  House	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Senate	  List	   N	  votes	   %	   of	  votes	   seats	   N	  votes	   %	  of	  votes	   seats	  Ass.	  Italiane	  in	  Sud	  America	   99,817	   33.12	   1	   85,745	   31.51	   1	  Unione	   83,373	   27.66	   1	   81,899	   30.10	   1	  Per	   Italia	   nel	  mondo-­‐	  Tremaglia	   35,207	   11.68	   1	   30,134	   11.07	   0	  Udc	   32,726	   10.86	   0	   25,593	   9.41	   0	  Forza	  Italia	   25,431	   8.44	   0	   24,141	   8.87	   0	  	  Sector	  Europe	  House	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Senate	  List	   N	  votes	   %	   of	  votes	   seats	   N	  votes	   %	  of	  votes	   seats	  Unione	   277,996	   52.73	   3	   256,355	   52.97	   1	  Forza	  Italia	   128,756	   24.42	   2	   118,306	   24.44	   1	  Di	  Pietro	   Italia	  dei	  Valori	   27,432	   5.20	   1	   26,486	   5.47	   0	  Udc	   24,236	   4.60	   0	   22,273	   4.60	   0	  Per	   Italia	   nel	  mondo-­‐	  Tremaglia	   20,271	   3.85	   0	   18,472	   3.82	   0	  Lega	  Nord	   12,319	   2.34	   0	   12,006	   2.48	   0	  Source:	  Ministero	  del	  Interno	  (2006)	  	  
3.2	  Mexico	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Despite	   the	   sporadic	   apparition	   of	   the	   topic	   of	   external	   voting	   in	  Mexican	   politics	   in	   the	  1920s,	  1940s	  and	  1970s	   (Santamaría	  Gómez,	  2001),	  Mexicans	  abroad	  did	  not	  vigorously	  campaign	  for	  external	  voting	  rights	  because	  the	  Mexican	  regime	  in	  place	  rendered	  elections	  “mere	   rituals”	   (Martínez	   Saldaña,	   1998:	   156).	   With	   increasing	   pressure	   on	   the	   leading	  
Partido	  Revolucionario	  Institucional	  (PRI)	  to	  liberalize	  the	  regime	  in	  the	  1990s,	  furthered	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  left-­‐wing	  Partido	  Revolucionario	  Democratico	  (PRD),	  which	  was	  strongly	  connected	   with	   Mexicans	   abroad,	   the	   party-­‐state	   began	   to	   develop	   policies	   towards	   the	  emigrants	  it	  had	  long	  neglected.	  Despite	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  PRI	  to	  extend	  voting	  rights	  to	  migrants,	  as	  leaders	  were	  convinced	  that	  emigrant	  voters	  would	  strongly	  boycott	  elections,	  a	   first	   step	   to	   extend	   voting	   rights	  was	   taken	   in	   the	   2000	  Presidential	   elections,	  when	   a	  limited	  number	  of	  emigrants	  were	  allowed	  to	  travel	  back	  to	  Mexican	  border	  cities	  and	  cast	  their	  votes	  there.	  With	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  the	  liberal	  party’s	  (PAN)	  candidate	  Vicente	  Fox	  in	  2000,	  the	  promise	  was	  rapidly	  made	  that	  external	  voting	  would	  be	  a	  reality	  by	  the	  next	   election.	   Despite	   the	   continuing	   pressure	   of	   emigrant	   associations	   that	   lobbied	  Congress	   to	   pass	   a	   law,	   political	   parties	   only	   reached	   an	   agreement	   on	   very	   restrictive	  external	   voting	   legislation	   for	   Presidential	   elections	   one	   year	   before	   the	   2006	   election.	  Anxieties	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  massive	  participation	  abroad	  on	  electoral	  results	  coupled	  with	  the	   fear	   of	   being	  blamed	   for	   preventing	  migrants	   from	  voting	  pushed	  political	   parties	   to	  adopt	  external	  voting	  measures	   that	  would	  prove	  very	  difficult	   to	   implement.	  The	   law	  of	  June	   28,	   2005	   reflects	   this	   compromise	   in	   four	   instances.	   First,	   the	   extra-­‐territorial	  constituency	  long	  demanded	  by	  the	  PRD	  would	  not	  be	  created	  at	  this	  stage	  and	  the	  voting	  right	  was	  thus	  limited	  to	  presidential	  elections.	  Second,	  only	  the	  emigrants	  who	  had	  a	  voter	  identity	   card	   (credencial	   de	   elector)	  would	  be	   able	   to	   vote,	   and	   the	   IFE	  would	  not	  make	  those	  cards	  accessible	  abroad.	  Third,	  campaigning	  and	  raising	  funds	  abroad	  was	  forbidden	  for	  Mexican	  political	  parties.	  Fourth,	  registered	  voters	  would	  only	  be	  able	  to	  cast	  their	  vote	  by	  registered	  mail.	  	  During	   preparation	   for	   external	   voting	   in	   2006,	   several	   experts	   warned	   that	   the	   rate	   of	  participation	   abroad	  was	   likely	   to	   be	   limited.	  An	   expert	   commission	   of	   the	   IFE	   set	   up	   in	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1998	   to	   study	   external	   voting	   in	   Mexico	   estimated	   that	   around	   11	   million	   Mexicans	  residing	   abroad	   would	   potentially	   qualify	   as	   voting	   citizens	   for	   the	   2000	   election.	   The	  commission	   also	   estimated	   that	   only	   1.5	   million	   of	   these	   emigrants	   had	   a	   valid	   voter	  identity	   card.	   Later,	   in	   a	   technical	   opinion	   addressed	   to	   Parliament	   in	   2005,	   the	   IFE	  estimated	   that	   4	   million	   Mexicans	   in	   the	   United	   States	   held	   a	   voter	   identity	   card	   but	  warned	   that	   different	   factors	  would	   reduce	   the	   actual	   participation	   (IFE,	   2005).	  Marcelli	  and	  Cornelius	  (2005)	  attempted	  to	  develop	  more	  realistic	  estimations	  based	  on	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  Mexican	  migrants	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  2000	  elections	  (in	  the	  special	  voting	  stations	  or	  in	  their	  electoral	  district	  before	  migrating).	  They	  evaluated	  the	  different	  levels	   of	   voters’	   educational	   attainment,	   and	   the	   distance	   between	   the	   emigrant	   and	   the	  border,	  and	  came	  up	  with	  a	  potential	  participation	  of	  125,000	   to	  360,000	  emigrants.	  For	  some	  migrants	   themselves,	   particularly	   the	   Coalition	   for	   the	   Political	   Rights	   of	  Mexicans	  Abroad	   (CDPME),	   a	   Mexican	   lobby	   group	   connected	   with	   emigrant	   associations	   in	   the	  United	  States,	   it	  was	  also	  clear	  that	  not	  all	  of	  the	  4	  millions	  emigrants	  supposed	  to	  hold	  a	  voter	   identity	   card	  would	   register	   to	   vote.	   It	   nonetheless	   expected	   that	   the	   associations’	  and	  the	  IFE’s	  joint	  effort	  in	  promoting	  registration	  would	  result	  in	  over	  10	  percent	  of	  them	  actually	  participating	  (Ross	  Pineda,	  2005).	  	  In	  fact,	  all	  of	  these	  estimations	  far	  exceeded	  the	  real	  registration	  level.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Italy,	  Mexico	  did	  not	  adopt	  the	  principle	  of	  automatic	  vote	  abroad.	  Those	  emigrants	  who	  have	  a	  voter	  ID	  card	  must	  thus	  fill	  out	  a	  registration	  form	  (either	  downloaded	  from	  the	  Internet	  or	  received	  at	  the	  distribution	  points	  set	  up	  by	  the	  IFE	  and	  the	  associations)	  and	  return	  it	  by	  registered	  mail	  to	  the	  IFE	  who	  would	  subsequently	  send	  them	  the	  electoral	  package	  by	  the	  Post.	  	  	  The	   IFE	   received	   57,677	   emigrants’	   application	   forms,	   and	   40,876	   of	   these	   requests	  actually	  fit	  the	  criteria	  for	  being	  added	  to	  voters’	  residing	  abroad	  electoral	  list.	  Eventually,	  79.8	   percent	   of	   these	   eligible	   voters	   (32,632)	   cast	   their	   votes	   in	   the	   2006	   presidential	  election	  if	  we	  consider	  turnout	  as	  the	  number	  of	  voters	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  emigrants	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who	  registered.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  data	  on	  the	  Mexican	  population	  of	  voting	   age	   and	   on	   the	  Mexican	   population	   eligible	   to	   vote	   (i.e.	   holding	   a	   voter	   ID	   card),	  turnout	   is	   likely	   to	  have	  been	   lower	   than	  1%	   if	  we	   refer	   these	   other	   ratios	   that	   are	   also	  used	   to	   measure	   voter	   turnout.	   These	   figures	   can	   hardly	   be	   compared	   to	   the	   overall	  participation	  figures	  (emigrant	  +	  resident	  voters)	  that	  show	  a	  58.55%	  turnout	  among	  the	  71,374,373	  registered	  voters	  in	  the	  2006	  Presidential	  Election.	  An	  additional	  element	  that	  is	   striking	   is	   that	   while	   Mexicans	   in	   the	   United	   States	   represent	   98%	   of	   the	   Mexican	  emigrant	  population,	  they	  only	  accounted	  for	  87%	  of	  the	  vote	  cast	  at	  the	  2006	  presidential	  election.	  	  These	   figures	   naturally	   spurred	   strong	   controversy	   between	   emigrants	   and	   Mexican	  authorities.	   The	   IFE	   in	   particular	   has	   been	   accused	   of	   not	   aggressively	   trying	   to	   register	  people	  abroad.	  Voices	  were	  also	  heard	  in	  Mexico	  among	  proponents	  of	  external	  voting	  that	  the	  associations	  abroad	  had	  waited	  for	  the	  IFE	  to	  do	  the	  work	  and	  had	  not	  encouraged	  their	  members	   to	   register.	   Despite	   their	   history	   of	   campaigning	   among	  Mexicans	   in	   the	   US	   in	  hope	  that	  emigrants	  would	  influences	  their	  relatives’	  vote,	  the	  new	  law	  that	  allowed	  for	  the	  direct	  political	  participation	  of	  migrants	  in	  elections	  now	  prevented	  political	  parties	  from	  campaigning	  abroad.	  This,	  in	  all	  likelihood,	  further	  undermined	  efforts	  to	  raise	  emigrants’	  awareness	  of	  the	  coming	  election.	  	  Table	  1.	  Registration	  by	  country	  of	  residence	  compared	  to	  Mexican	  population	  




(incl. -18 y.o.) 
USA 35,763 11,5 million 
Spain 1,238 21,107 
Canada 863 49,925 
France 510 1,392 
UK 447 5,297 
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Germany 393 9,225 
Italy 212 6,798 
Switzerland 188 751 
Netherlands 100 3,000 
Belgium 83 1,338 
Other 1079  Sources:	  (COVE,	  2006)	  (IME	  unpublished	  statistics,	  2010).	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  regional	  state	  of	  origin	  of	  those	  registered	  emigrants,	  Table	  2	  shows	  that	  a	  majority	   comes	   from	   the	   Federal	   district	   and	   that	  more	   than	   half	   of	   them	   actually	   come	  from	   just	   5	   of	   the	   32	  Mexican	   states.	   It	  may	   appear	   surprising	   that	   traditional	  migrant-­‐sending	  states	  like	  Zacatecas	  have	  not	  performed	  better	  in	  terms	  of	  registration	  especially	  when	   they	   are	   known	   for	   the	   dynamism	   of	   transnational	   associations	   and	   for	   the	  authorities’	   support	   of	   transnational	   political	   participation	   at	   the	   local	   level	   (Moctezuma	  Longoria,	  2003).	  	  	  Table	  2.	  Mexican	  state	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  emigrants	  who	  submitted	  a	  registration	  form	  	  
Region	  of	  Origin	   Number	  of	  requests	  Federal	  District	   6,281	  Jalisco	   5,047	  State	  of	  Mexico	   4,149	  Michoacan	   3,368	  Guanajuato	   2,793	  Nuevo	  Leon	   1,799	  Puebla	   1,631	  Baja	  California	  Norte	   1,582	  Chihuahua	   1,235	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Veracruz	   1,191	  Other	   11,800	  Source:	  COVE	  2006	  	  The	   elections	   results	   abroad	   appear	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   overall	   election	   results	   as	  shown	   in	   table	   3.	   Naturally,	   the	   representative	   character	   of	   the	   33,131	   voters	   who	  participated	  is	  questionable	  due	  to	  the	   likely	  selection	  bias	   introduced	  by	  the	   law	  (Smith,	  2008).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  limited	  experiment	  confirmed	  the	  trend	  that	  Mexican	  scholars	  had	  observed	  during	  the	  2000	  elections	  when	  special	  polling	  stations	  where	  set	  up	  in	  Mexican	  border	   towns	   (Espinoza	  Valle,	  2004)	   (2):	   strong	  performances	  of	   the	  PRD	  and	  especially	  the	   liberal	   party	   PAN,	   while	   the	   former	   state-­‐party,	   the	   PRI,	   performed	   far	   worse	   with	  emigrants	   than	  with	  citizens	  on	   the	  national	   territory.	  As	  opposed	   to	   these	  observations,	  the	  survey	  conducted	  among	  more	  than	  1000	  Mexicans	  in	  Dallas,	  San	  Diego	  and	  Indiana	  by	  McCann,	   Cornelius	   and	   Leal	   (2006)	   confirms	   the	   selection	   bias	   in	   the	   emigrant	   voting	  population.	   Indeed,	   their	   sample,	   which	   included	   voters	   and	   non	   voters,	   showed	   similar	  political	  preferences	  to	  those	  shown	  by	  the	  whole	  Mexican	  population	  at	  the	  2006	  election	  therefore	  supporting	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  33,000	  emigrant	  voters	  might	  not	  be	  representative	  of	   the	  whole	  emigrant	  population.	  Considering	   the	   importance	   for	  political	  parties	  of	   the	  potential	  support	  or	  opposition	  they	  can	  find	  abroad	  in	  shaping	  their	  position	  on	  external	  voting,	  this	  information	  seems	  particularly	  important.	  	  	  A	  last	  element	  worth	  mentioning	  is	  that	  the	  very	  disputed	  2006	  Presidential	  Election	  was	  decided	  by	  around	  250,000	  votes	  (which	  created	  a	  major	  post-­‐electoral	  controversy	  in	  the	  country).	   Since	   the	   total	   number	   of	   voters	  who	   casted	   their	   ballots	   from	   abroad	   did	   not	  come	  anyway	  near	  that	  number,	  no	  suspicion	  was	  raised	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  external	  voting	  process	  or	   the	  vote	   itself.	  However,	   the	   limited	   first	   experience	  of	   external	   voting	  from	  abroad	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  right.	  	  Table	  3.	  Results	  abroad	  and	  overall	  (residents	  +	  emigrants)	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Candidate	   %	  among	  emigrants	   Overall	  results	  Felipe	  Caderón	  (PAN)	   58,29	   35,89	  Andrés	  Manuel	  López	  Obrador	  (PRD)	   34,00	   35,31	  Roberto	  Madrazo	  (PRI)	   4,17	   22,26	  Patricia	  Mercado	  (Alternativa)	   2,72	   2,70	  Roberto	  Campa	  (NA)	   0,39	   0,96	  Write-­‐in	  candidates	   0,09	   0,71	  Double	  votes	  /	  null	  votes	   0,34	   2,16	  Source:	  COVE	  2006	  	  
3.3	  Belgium	  
	  The	  case	  of	  Belgium	  illustrates	   important	  differences	  with	  the	  other	  countries	  detailed	   in	  this	   article.	   Despite	   a	   long	   history	   of	   migration,	   Belgium	   has	   not	   experience	   large	  emigration	   flows	   since	   the	   end	   of	   World	   War	   II	   (with	   the	   exception	   of	   Belgians	   to	   the	  former	   Congolese	   colony).	   Also,	   the	   existence	   of	   only	   two	   large	   emigrant	   associations	  underlines	   the	   weak	   sense	   of	   community	   for	   Belgians	   abroad.	   For	   that	   reason,	   while	  legislative	  proposals	  had	  been	  on	  the	  agenda	  for	  decades,	  external	  voting	  has	  certainly	  not	  been	  a	  priority	  for	  most	  political	  parties	  except	  for	  the	  liberals	  who	  considered	  emigrants	  as	  potential	  right-­‐wing	  voters.	  The	  adoption	  of	  such	  legislation	  in	  1998	  is	  therefore	  more	  the	   result	   of	   political	   bargaining	   by	   the	   liberals	   than	   the	   conclusion	   of	   a	   struggle	   led	   by	  migrants	  themselves.	  Indeed,	  the	  Belgian	  government	  was	  forced	  to	  reform	  its	  constitution	  to	  comply	  with	  EU	  rules	  that	  EU	  citizens	  residing	  in	  Belgium	  to	  participate	  to	  local	  elections	  there.	  The	  government	  at	   the	   time	  did	  not	  have	   the	  majority	   to	   reform	   the	  constitution	   ,	  and	   a	   deal	   was	   struck	   with	   the	   liberals	   (in	   the	   opposition	   then)	   to	   pass	   legislation	   on	  external	   voting	   at	   Federal	   legislative	   elections	   in	   exchange	   for	   their	   support	   of	  constitutional	  reform.	  The	  external	  voting	  law	  on	  December	  18,	  1998	  	  was	  the	  result	  of	  this	  political	   compromise.	   Its	   content,	   as	   much	   as	   the	   legislative	   debates	   that	   preceded	   the	  adoption	   of	   the	   law,	   underscored	   the	   reserves	   that	   many	   parties	   had	   against	   external	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voting.	   It	   is	   therefore	  not	   surprising	   that	   the	   legislation	  was	  passed	  was	  very	   restrictive.	  	  Looking	   at	   this	   law	   and	   its	   effects	   and	   subsequent	   reforms	   nonetheless	   illustrates	   the	  impact	  of	  administrative	  barriers.	  	  The	  1998	  law	  provided	  that,	  similarly	  to	  other	  countries,	  only	  those	  citizens	  whose	  names	  are	  in	  the	  consular	  registry	  may	  register	  as	  external	  voters.	  In	  contrast	  to	  resident	  voters	  in	  Belgium,	  voting	  from	  abroad	  was	  not	  automatic,	  nor	  an	  obligation.	  Second,	  the	  voter-­‐to-­‐be	  had	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  he	  met	  certain	  registration	  criteria:	  legal	  voting	  age,	  proof	  of	  legal	  residence	  abroad,	  not	  being	  sentenced	  for	  crimes	  that	  would	  cause	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  Belgium,	  as	  well	  as	  certify	  that	  he	  did	  not	  have	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  elections	  of	  his	  country	  of	  residence	  (justified	  by	  the	  “one	  man	  –	  one	  vote	  principle”).	  Third,	  the	  candidate	  was	  required	  to	  declare	  a	  voting	  proxy,	  who	  was	  an	  eligible	  voter	  residing	  in	  Belgium	  and	  a	  relative	  up	  to	  the	  third	  degree.	  This	  criteria	  forced	  emigrants	  to	  find	  relatives	  back	  home	  in	  Belgium	  to	  vote	  in	  their	  name	  on	  Election	  Day,	  rather	  than	  allow	  them	  to	  vote	  directly	  by	  mail	   ballot	   or	   in	   consulates.	   Further	   complicating	   the	   voting	   process,	   the	   proxy	   was	  required	   to	   show	   the	   electoral	   officer	   different	   documents	   on	   Election	   Day,	   including	   a	  form	   delivered	   by	   the	   emigrant’s	   embassy	   or	   the	   consulate	   no	   earlier	   than	   fifteen	   days	  before	   the	   election,	   stating	   that	   the	   emigrant	   voter	   was	   still	   alive!	   The	   Belgian	  government’s	   strict	   requirements	   obviously	   produced	   low	   rates	   of	   participation	   by	  external	  voters.	  In	  illustration	  of	  this,	  only	  18	  electors	  only	  cast	  their	  vote	  from	  abroad	  at	  the	  1999	  Federal	  legislative	  elections.	  	  	  This	   situation	   outraged	   the	   liberals,	  who	   considered	   their	   part	   of	   the	  deal	   unfulfilled.	  As	  they	  entered	   the	  government	  majority	   in	  1999,	   they	  quickly	  created	  modifications	   to	   the	  law.	   The	   first	   step	   actually	   consisted	   in	   passing	   a	   law	  on	   June	   26,	   2002	  which	   created	   a	  single	   consular	   registry.	   While	   emigrants	   would	   be	   free	   to	   request	   to	   be	   added	   to	   the	  registry,	   their	   registration	  would	  create	   the	  obligation	   to	  vote	   in	   legislative	  elections	   just	  like	  for	  Belgian	  residents.	  However,	  unlike	  for	  Belgian	  residents	  or	  Italian	  external	  voters,	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registration	  would	  still	  not	  be	  automatic,	  and	  emigrants	  would	  have	   to	  reply	  before	  each	  election	  to	  an	  invitation	  to	  register.	  	  The	  law	  of	  March	  7,	  2002	  substantially	  changed	  the	  voting	  procedures	  for	  Belgians	  abroad.	  Emigrant	   voters	   were	   now	   offered	   several	   modalities	   to	   cast	   their	   ballot:	   in	   person	   by	  returning	   to	   Belgium	   on	   Election	   Day,	   by	   proxy	   in	   Belgium,	   by	   proxy	   at	   an	  embassy/consulate,	   or	   by	   mail.	   Emigrants	   now	   could	   also	   choose	   the	   municipality	   (and	  therefore	   the	  electoral	  district)	   in	  which	   their	  votes	  would	  be	  counted.	  Until	   today,	   in	  an	  ethnically	   divided	   country	   like	   Belgium,	   this	   situation	   has	   raised	   concern	   among	   some	  politicians	   that	   emigrants	   chose	   to	   vote	   in	   electoral	   districts	   with	   which	   they	   have	   no	  legitimate	  connection,	  but	  where	  they	  feel	  they	  can	  have	  a	  greater	  impact.	  	  	  	  The	   creation	   of	   the	   consular	   registry	   allowed	   for	   the	   registration	   of	   215,701	  Belgians	   of	  eligible	  voting	  age	  residing	  abroad.	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  large	  concentration	  of	  Belgians	  abroad	  in	  Europe	  (66.29%	  of	  them	  live	  in	  EU-­‐15	  countries),	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  many	  emigrants	  do	   not	   see	   a	   real	   benefit	   of	   registering	   with	   the	   Belgian	   embassies	   and	   consulates	   and	  would	   therefore	  not	  appear	   in	   the	  consular	   register.	  Table	  1	  below	   lists	  emigrant	  voters’	  places	  of	   residence,	  which	  unsurprisingly	   indicates	   that	   the	   countries	  hosting	   the	   largest	  number	  of	  Belgian	  citizens	  also	  host	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  voters.	  	  Of	  the	  more	  than	  200,000	  eligible	  voters,	  114,677	  sent	  the	  voter	  registration	  form	  back	  to	  the	  administration	  before	  the	  deadline	  ((SPF	  Intérieur,	  2007).	  In	  other	  words,	  about	  half	  of	  the	  potential	  emigrant	  electorate	  complied	  with	  the	  requirement	  to	  ask	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  voter	  list.	  Looking	  now	  at	  the	  turnout	  figures	  defined	  as	  the	  number	  of	  external	  voters	  on	  the	  number	  of	   registered	  voters	  abroad,	   the	   limited	  data	  available	   shows	   that	  87.64%	  of	  those	  who	  had	  chosen	  to	  vote	  in	  person	  or	  by	  proxy	  at	  embassies/consulates	  showed	  up,	  while	  65.95%	  of	  those	  who	  chose	  to	  vote	  by	  mail	  did.	  By	  comparison,	  91.9%	  of	  the	  Belgian	  population	  eligible	  to	  vote	  actually	  participated	  to	  the	  2003	  elections.	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Looking	   at	   the	   regional	   distribution	   of	   voters,	   37.2%	   of	   the	   registered	   voters	   chose	   to	  register	  with	  a	  municipality	  belonging	  to	  a	  Flemish	  province,	  37.8%	  chose	  to	  register	  with	  a	  municipality	  belonging	  to	  a	  Walloon	  province,	  and	  25%	  registered	  in	  the	  Brussels	  district.	  These	   figures	   confirm	   that	   since	   French-­‐speaking	   Belgians	   are	   over-­‐represented	   in	   the	  emigrant	  population,	  there	  is	  likely	  no	  regional	  bias	  in	  the	  emigrant	  voting	  population.	  	  	  Table	  1.	  Countries	  of	  residence	  of	  registered	  voters	  
	   Country	  of	  residence	   Number	  of	  registered	  
Belgian	  voters	  in	  2003	  1	   France	   29,506	  2	   Netherlands	   10,735	  3	   Germany	   10,336	  4	   Spain	   7,711	  5	   Luxemburg	  	   7,631	  	  6	   United	  States	   6,520	  7	   Switzerland	   6,132	  8	   Great-­‐Britain	   4,258	  9	   Canada	   3,704	  10	   Italy	   3,088	  11	   South	  Africa	   2,653	  12	   Argentina	   2,596	  	  Concerning	  the	  chosen	  voting	  modalities,	  18.7%	  registered	  to	  vote	  either	  in	  person	  (5%)	  or	  by	   proxy	   in	   Belgium	   (13.7%),	   14%	   chose	   to	   vote	   either	   in	   person	   (13.2%)	   or	   by	   proxy	  (0.8%)	  in	  an	  embassy/consulate,	   	  and	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  (67.6%)	  decided	  to	  vote	  by	  mail.	   The	  mail	   option	  was	   certainly	   the	   easiest	   and	   cheapest	  way	   to	   cast	   a	   vote	   from	  abroad,	  considering	  the	  distance	  that	  sometimes	  separates	  the	  emigrant	  from	  an	  embassy.	  A	  quick	  calculation	  allows	  us	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  emigrant	  vote.	  	  	  Before	   I	   examine	   the	   results,	   it	  must	   be	  mentioned	   that	  most	   of	   the	   political	   parties	   did	  nothing	  to	  encourage	  Belgians	  abroad	  to	  register	  to	  vote,	  and	  very	  little	  to	  attract	  emigrant	  votes.	  The	  most	  active	  party	   is	   the	  French-­‐speaking	   liberal	  party	  MR,	  which	   	  sent	  a	   letter	  with	   its	   platform	   to	   Belgians	   abroad.	   Also,	   the	   liberal	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   took	  advantage	   of	   his	   presence	   abroad	   to	  meet	   with	   the	   Belgian	   emigrant	   community.	   Other	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parties	  merel	  set	  up	  sections	  dedicated	  to	  Belgians	  abroad	  on	  their	  websites,	  or	  advertised	  their	  platforms	  in	  the	  newsletter	  of	  the	  French-­‐speaking	  emigrant	  association.	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  election	  results,	  it	  must	  be	  clarified	  that	  only	  the	  ballots	  of	  those	  expatriates	  who	  voted	  in	  person	  or	  by	  proxy	  in	  an	  embassy	  or	  in	  a	  consulate	  are	  counted	  by	  the	  special	  counting	   station	   set	  up	  by	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	   (which	   subsequently	   sends	   the	  results	   to	  the	  head	  counting	  station	  of	  each	  electoral	  college).	   In	  contrast,	  emigrants	  who	  chose	   any	   of	   the	   three	   other	  modalities	   had	   their	   votes	  mixed	  with	   those	   of	   the	   general	  voting	   population	   before	   the	   count.	   Accordingly,	   we	   only	   know	   the	   results	   of	   a	   fraction	  (14%)	  of	   the	  Belgian	  emigrant	   community	  who	  has	  voted.	  These	   results	   are	  nonetheless	  striking	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  overall	  results	  of	  the	  2003	  elections.	  As	  the	  elections	  for	  the	  Chamber	  and	  the	  Senate	  are	  held	  on	  the	  same	  day,	  the	  results	  between	  the	  two	  elections	  is	  quite	  similar.	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  will	  only	  compare	  the	  results	  of	  the	  emigrant	  vote	  and	  of	  the	   overall	   Belgian	   population	   in	   the	   Senate	   in	   the	   two	   main	   regions	   (Flanders	   and	  Wallonia,	  excluding	  Brussels).	  	  Table	  4.	  2003	  elections	  results	  –	  Senate	  (Flanders)	  
Flemish	  constituency	   Overall	  
results	  (%)	  
Result	   of	   emigrant	   vote	   in	  
embassies	  /consulates	  (%)	  Sp.a-­‐spirit	   25.44	   12.21	  VLD	   24.36	   31.01	  CD&V	   20.54	   20.18	  Vlaams	  Blok	   17.93	   16.23	  N-­‐VA	   4.85	   4.39	  AGALEV	   3.94	   8.78	  	  Table	  5.	  2003	  elections	  results	  –	  Senate	  (Wallonia)	  
Walloon	  constituency	   Overall	  
results	  (%)	  
Result	   of	   emigrant	   vote	   in	  
embassies	  /consulates	  (%)	  PS	   35.60	   20.35	  MR	   30.29	   39.69	  CDH	   15.51	   11.04	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ECOLO	   7.69	   17.40	  FN	   6.04	   2.79	  	  As	  expected	  by	  these	  parties	  themselves,	  the	  biggest	  beneficiaries	  of	  external	  voting	  in	  both	  regions	  are	  the	  liberals	  (MR	  and	  VLD)	  who	  are	  both	  the	  preferred	  parties	  of	  the	  emigrant	  community.	  The	  second	  largest	  beneficiaries	  are	  the	  ecologist	  parties	  (ECOLO	  and	  AGALEV)	  who	  both	  do	  twice	  as	  well	  in	  the	  emigrant	  community	  as	  in	  the	  overall	  population.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   the	   two	  Socialists	  parties	   (Walloon	  PS	  and	  Flemish	  Sp.a)	   clearly	   find	  much	   less	  support	   in	   the	   emigrant	   community	   than	   in	   the	   overall	   population.	   Perhaps	   the	   most	  intersting	  result	  of	  this	  comparative	  analysis	  is	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  Flemish	  nationalist	  and	   extreme-­‐right	   party	   Vlaams	   Blok	   which	   seems	   contradictory	   with	   the	   usual	   clichés	  attached	  to	  Belgian	  emigrants	  (where	  crossing	  borders	  reinforces	  the	  feeling	  of	  attachment	  to	   unitary	   Belgium).	   However,	   as	   the	   Vlaams	   Blok	   has	   progressively	   gained	   a	   status	   of	  legitimate	  political	   actor	   in	   the	   Flemish	  political	   arena,	   it	   is	   less	   surprising	   that,	   just	   like	  voters	  residing	  in	  Belgium,	  emigrant	  voters	  may	  be	  attracted	  to	  this	  party.	  	  
3.4	  Bolivia	  	  The	   issue	   of	   external	   voting	   in	   Bolivia	   presents	   several	   similarities	   to	   Mexico.	   Indeed,	  Bolivian	  authorities	  have	  long	  neglected	  migration	  issues	  and	  expressed	  more	  concern	  for	  regulating	   inflows	  towards	  Bolivia	   than	  designing	  policies	   towards	   its	  population	  abroad.	  The	  adoption	  of	  electoral	  reform	  in	  1991,	  without	  implementing	  the	  necessary	  legislation	  to	   make	   it	   a	   reality,	   confirms	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   was	   little	   interest	   on	   the	   part	   of	  governmental	   authorities.	   This	   situation	   changed	   in	   the	   2000s,	   however,	   as	   social	  confrontations	  on	  natural	  resources	  led	  to	  the	  eventual	  resignation	  of	  President	  Mesa	  and	  the	  election	  of	  President	  Evo	  Morales	  and	  his	  Movimiento	  al	  Socialismo	   (MAS)	  party.	  This	  process	  saw	  Bolivian	  migrants	  residing	   in	  Argentina	  strongly	  becoming	  involved	  in	  home	  country	   politics,	   by	   organizing	   marches	   in	   Buenos	   Aires	   and	   supporting	   protesting	  movements	   in	   Bolivia	   from	   abroad.	   In	   this	   context	   of	   the	   growing	   politicization	   of	  emigrants,	  the	  demand	  for	  external	  voting	  rights	  became	  more	  and	  more	  acute.	  In	  2005,	  a	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Bolivian	   Court	   ruled	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   emigrants,	   stating	   that	   the	   recognition	   the	   1991	  electoral	  reforms	  should	  be	  properly	  implemented.	  	  	  With	  the	  coming	  to	  power	  of	  Morales	  in	  2006,	  Bolivian	  discourse	  and	  policies	  on	  migration	  changed	   radically	   (Domenech	   and	   Hinojosa	   Gordonava,	   2009).	   At	   the	   discursive	   level,	  similarly	  to	  Mexico	  under	  Fox,	  Bolivians	  abroad	  moved	  from	  being	  the	  “forgotten	  citizens”	  to	   central	   actors	   in	   the	   process	   of	   the	   change	   that	   MAS	   wished	   to	   implement	   in	   that	  country.	   Similarly,	   Morales	   engaged	   in	   controversy	  with	   the	   European	   Union,	   by	   openly	  criticizing	  an	  EU	  directive	  on	  the	  return	  of	  undocumented	  immigrants.	  On	  the	  policy	  level,	  Morales’s	  government	  integrated	  the	  issue	  of	  emigration	  in	  its	  National	  Development	  Plan	  and	  reformed	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  consular	  services.	  Most	  importantly,	  however,	   in	  a	  way	  that	   was	   consistent	   with	   his	   discourse	   on	   the	   involvement	   of	   emigrants	   in	   the	   political	  community	   and	   in	   response	   to	   the	   continuing	   pressures	   pressure	   of	   emigrants,	   Morales	  promised	  to	  make	  external	  voting	  a	  reality.	  	  	  On	  May	  21,	  2008,	  Congress	  adopted	  a	  proposal	  of	  a	   law	  on	  external	  voting,	  and	  sent	   it	   to	  the	  Senate	  where	   it	  was	   subsequently	  blocked	  by	   the	   right-­‐wing	  opposition	   (PODEMOS).	  The	   latter	   strongly	   feared	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   electorate,	   as	   emigrants	   in	  Argentina	  (where	  most	  Bolivians	  abroad	  concentrate)	  proved	  to	  be	  very	  supportive	  of	  Evo	  Morales	  (an	  impression	  confirmed	  by	  the	  symbolic	  vote	  abroad	  organized	  by	  pro-­‐Morales	  associations	  in	  Argentina	  for	  the	  2008	  Referendum).	  Despite	  the	  official	  recognition	  of	  the	  right	   to	   vote	   from	   abroad	   in	   the	   new	   constitution	   adopted	   by	   referendum	   in	   2009,	   no	  solution	  was	  in	  sight	  in	  the	  Senate.	  At	  that	  stage,	  knowing	  that	  pressure	  would	  eventually	  lead	  the	  opposition	  to	  comprise,	  Evo	  Morales	  began	  a	  hunger	  strike	  to	  force	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  new	   transitory	   electoral	   law,	  of	  which	  external	   voting	  was	   among	   the	  most	   sensitive	  issues.	  Rapidly,	  emigrant	  associations	  throughout	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	   followed	  the	  strike	  in	  front	  of	  embassies	  and	  consulates.	  This	  strategy	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  Law	  4021	  on	  April	  14,	  2009,	  which	  allowed	  legislative	  and	  presidential	  elections	  to	  be	  held	  that	   same	   year,	   after	   the	   creation	   of	   new	   biometric	   voter	   registry	   and	   the	   inclusion	   of	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external	  voting	  provisions	  by	  mail	  ballot	  for	  presidential	  elections,	  though	  under	  very	  strict	  conditions.	  	  	  Three	  elements	  of	  this	  law	  must	  be	  underlined.	  First,	  only	  the	  Bolivians	  residing	  in	  the	  four	  of	  the	  largest	  receiving	  countries	  -­‐Argentina,	  Brazil,	  Spain	  and	  the	  USA-­‐	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  register	  as	  external	  voters.	  Second,	  the	  law	  states	  that	  emigrant	  voters	  cannot	  represent	  more	   than	   6%	   of	   the	   total	   voter	   registry	   (a	   figure	   determined	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   last	  election’s	  registry).	  In	  addition,	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  the	  influence	  of	  Bolivians	  in	  Argentina,	  no	  single	   country	   of	   residence	   can	   concentrate	  more	   than	   half	   of	   the	   total	   emigrant	   voting	  population	   abroad.	   The	   decision	   was	   taken	   to	   grant	   each	   of	   the	   four	   countries	   a	   target	  registration	   figure	   according	   to	   the	   relative	   size	   of	   the	   Bolivian	   community	   in	   these	  countries.	  Third,	  the	  National	  Electoral	  Court	  of	  Bolivia	  (CNE)	  is	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  process	  of	  registration	  abroad,	  and	  has	  30	  days	  to	  register	  a	  maximum	  of	  211,093	  emigrant	  voters	  in	  the	   four	   host	   countries.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Belgium	   and	   Italy,	   at	   no	   point	   were	   the	   consular	  authorities	  involved	  in	  the	  registration	  process.	  Also,	  the	  CNE	  could	  not	  count	  the	  Bolivia’s	  consulat	   register	   to	   get	   in	   touch	  with	   voters	   (the	   register	   of	   external	   voters	   thus	   started	  from	   a	   blank	   sheet).	   Also,	   it	   is	   worth	   mentioning	   that	   Bolivia	   beneficiated	   from	   the	  expertise	  of	  Mexico’s	   IFE	   in	  the	  registration	  of	  voters	  abroad	  (despite	  the	  controversy	  on	  the	  IFE’s	  management	  of	  the	  registration	  of	  Mexicans	  abroad).	  	  With	  very	  restrictive	   legislation,	   the	   impossibility	  to	  use	  the	  consular	  network	  to	  register	  voters,	   and	   the	   limited	  resources	  granted	   to	  Bolivia’s	  National	  Electoral	  Court	   to	   register	  voters	  in	  four	  countries	  under	  a	  time	  limit	  of	  only	  30	  days,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  legal	  limit	   to	  voter	   registration	  abroad	  has	  not	  yet	  been	   reached.	   Indeed,	  only,	  169,096	  voters	  residing	  abroad	  were	  added	   to	   the	  biometric	   voting	   register.	   Compared	   to	   the	  estimated	  Bolivian	   population	   abroad,	   of	   around	   2	   million	   this	   figure	   seems	   somehow	   limited.	  However,	   in	   comparison	   to	   Mexico,	   which	   has	   comparably	   restrictive	   registration	  procedures,	  the	  Bolivian	  performance	  appears	  more	  positive.	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population	   (incl.	   -­
18.	  y.o.)	  
Maximum	  number	  
of	   voters	   to	   be	  
registered	  
Actual	   number	   of	  
registered	  voters	  
Turnout	   (N	  
voters/N	  
registered	  voters)	  
Argentina	   1.08	  million	   105,546	   89,953	   73.9%	  Spain	   386,000	   38,380	   49,995	   71,4%	  USA	   366,000	   44,137	   11,006	   77,08%	  Brazil	   296,000	   23,028	   18,142	   78,7%	  Source:	  IBCE	  2008,	  CNE	  2009.	  	  As	  revealed	  during	  fieldwork	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  difference	  with	  Bolivia’s	  CNE	  seems	  to	  be	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	  Mexico’s	   IFE,	   it	   did	  not	   simply	  hand	  out	   registration	   forms,	  but	  went	  directly	  into	  on	  the	  field	  to	  meet	  with	  potential	  voters	  and	  help	  them,	  one	  by	  one,	  to	  register.	  Like	  in	  Mexico,	  turnout	  among	  Bolivians	  abroad	  (defined	  by	  N	  voters	  abroad	  /	  N	  registered	  voters)	   tends	   to	  be	  very	  high.	  However,	   the	   influence	  of	   the	  obligatory	  vote	   in	  Bolivian	   elections	   (a	   rule	   that	   has	   not	   applied	   to	   external	   voters)	   should	   not	   be	  underestimated	   as	   a	   factor	   that	   influences	   voter	   turnout	   (above	   70%	   abroad).	   Voter	  turnout	  among	  Bolivian	  residents	  was	  95,25%.	  	  	  An	  equally	   interesting	  piece	  of	   information	  revealed	  by	  the	  Spanish	  press	  was	  that	  some	  Bolivian	  voters-­‐to-­‐be	  in	  Sevilla	  had	  beneficiated	  from	  the	  support	  local	  authorities	  to	  go	  to	  Madrid	  and	  register	  as	  voters	  from	  abroad	  (ABC,	  15/10/2009).	  The	  fact	  that	  Spain	  will	  host	  local	  elections	  next	  year,	  in	  which	  Bolivians	  will	  be	  invited	  to	  participate	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  may	  have	  impacted	  this	  decision.	  The	  case	  of	  Spain	  is	  also	  interesting	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  country	   where	   the	   original	   registration	   limits	   set	   by	   authorities	   have	   been	   exceeded.	  Indeed,	   as	   the	   registration	   deadline	  was	   coming	   closer,	   the	   decision	  was	   taken	   to	   allow	  more	  voters	  to	  register	  there,	  as	  other	  countries	  would	  not	  reach	  their	  limit.	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The	  Spanish	  exception	  is	  also	  visible	  in	  election	  results.	  While	  results	  are	  very	  clear	  in	  all	  other	   three	   countries,	  Bolivians	   in	   Spain	  are	   split	   between	   the	   two	  big	  political	   forces	  of	  Bolivia.	   This	   situation	   encourages	   analysis	   on	   the	   timing	   of	   Bolivian	   migration	   to	   Spain	  (more	   recent)	   and	   its	   socio-­‐economic	   profile	   to	   explain	   both	   turnout	   and	   results	   there.	  Strong	   differences	   in	   electoral	   results	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   the	   two	   Latin	  American	   countries	   further	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   these	   factors.	   Finally,	   electoral	  results	   in	   Argentina	   and	   Brazil	   confirm	   the	   right-­‐wing	   fear	   that	   Bolivian	  migrants	   there	  would	   massively	   support	   Morales,	   and	   certainly	   encouraging	   them	   to	   argue	   in	   favor	   of	  maintaining	  restrictive	  registration	  procedures	  abroad	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Table	  2.	  Results	  of	  the	  2009	  Presidential	  Elections	  
	   MAS	  (Morales)	   Convergencia	  (Reyes)	  Argentina	   92,.13	   3,.19	  Brazil	   94,.95	   2,.73	  USA	   31,.03	   61,.04	  Spain	   48,.21	   43,.04	  Total	  vote	  abroad	   75,.77	   18,.44	  Domestic	  results	   63,.91	   26,.68	  Source:	  CNE	  2009	  	  
4.	  Defining	  variables	  to	  analyze	  emigrant	  voter	  turnout	  	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  presented	  above	  has	  provided	  rich	  material	  in	  terms	  of	  determining	  the	   possible	   variables	   explaining	   emigrant	   voter	   turnout	   in	   home	   country	   elections.	   To	  conclude	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  refer	  back	  to	  the	  three	  variables	  identified	  by	  Geys	  (2006),	  but	  will	  modify	  them	  based	  on	  my	  empirical	  analysis.	  Under	  these	  three	  renewed	  categories,	  I	  therefore	  list	  the	  variables	  that	  –even	  though	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  isolate	  the	  exact	  influences	  on	   voter	   turnout-­‐	   I	   have	   found	   deserving	   of	   specific	   attention	   in	   the	   analysis	   on	   the	  implementation	  external	  voting.	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4.1	  Institutional	  variables	  	  Contrarily	   to	   Geys,	   I	   wish	   to	   begin	   this	   discussion	   with	   the	   influence	   of	   institutional	  variables	   that	   I	   have	   found	   to	   occupy	   significant	   space	   in	   political	   parties	   and	  migrants’	  discussion	  on	  external	  voter	  turnout.	  Registration	  requirements	  are	  among	  the	  most	  crucial	  elements	  in	  voter	  turnout.	  We	  must	  be	  mindful	  that	  registration	  requirements	  influence	  the	  capacity	   of	   eligible	   external	   voters	   to	   register,	   and	   thus	   must	   not	   influence	   our	  understanding	  of	  voter	   turnout	  as	  defined	  by	   the	  number	  of	  actual	  voters	  divided	  by	   the	  number	  of	  registered	  voters.	  	  	  Despite	  intuitions	  going	  in	  that	  direction,	  the	  analysis	  of	  Bolivia	  and	  Mexico	  (two	  countries	  with	  restrictive	  external	  voting	  legislation)	  does	  not	  necessarily	  prove	  that	  larger	  numbers	  of	   migrants	   would	   have	   registered	   and	   voted	   from	   abroad	   if	   less	   restrictive	   legislation	  existed.	  The	  case	  of	  Belgium	  however,	  exemplifies	  how	  this	  is	  just	  so.	  Belgium	  moved	  from	  a	   very	   restrictive	   external	   voting	   system	   in	   1999	   (pushing	   registration	   and	   voting	  requirements	  to	  ridiculous	  and	  costly	  extremes)	  to	  more	  flexible	  legislation	  in	  2002.	  From	  less	   than	   20	   voters	   in	   1999,	   Belgium	  now	   experiences	   the	   participation	   of	   over	   100,000	  voters	   in	   both	   the	   2003	   and	   2007	   legislative	   federal	   elections.	   This	   extreme	   example	  underlines	   the	   necessity	   to	   look	   at	   the	   details	   of	   external	   voting	   legislation	   in	   order	   to	  understand	  voter	  turnout.	  	  	  As	  I	  have	  shown	  above,	  the	  analysis	  of	  registration	  requirements	  must	  also	  always	  consider	  the	   political	   negotiation	   at	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   adoption	   of	   these	   rules:	   as	   the	   adoption	   of	  external	   voting	   legislation	   anticipates	   supporters	   (convinced	   that	   external	   voters	   would	  vote	   for	   them)	   and	   opponents	   (convinced	   of	   the	   contrary).	   	   In	   debating	   on	   registration	  procedures,	   the	   very	   content	   of	   external	   voting	   legislation	   thus	   often	   reflects	   the	   power	  that	  different	  political	  parties	  have	  at	  the	  time	  of	  adoption	  of	  the	  law.	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More	  precisely,	  which	  elements	  of	  the	  registration	  procedures	  should	  one	  pay	  attention	  to?	  A	  crucial	  difference	  between	  the	  Latin	  American	  and	  European	  case	  studies	  concerns	   the	  
initiative	   to	   register.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Belgium	   and	   most	   importantly	   Italy,	   the	   authorities	  contact	  emigrant	  voters	  and	  invite	  them	  to	  vote.	  Voters	  simply	  have	  to	  respond	  (in	  the	  case	  of	   Italy,	   the	   only	  way	   of	   not	   voting	   from	   abroad	   is	   to	   actually	   throw	   away	   the	   electoral	  package,	   since	   registration	   is	   automatic).	   In	  Bolivia	  and	  Mexico,	  on	   the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   the	  migrants	  themselves	  who	  must	  request	  voting	  rights.	  They	  must	  send	  a	  form	  to	  authorities	  and	  ask	  to	  vote	   from	  abroad.	  Because	  consulates	  are	  kept	  away	  from	  electoral	  processes,	  the	  electoral	  authorities	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  registration	  process	  do	  not	  even	  have	  a	  database	  to	  use	  to	  send	  invitations	  to	  vote	  from	  abroad.	  They	  must	  thus	  have	  to	  go	  out	  on	  the	  field	  and	   look	   for	   potential	   voters	   in	   migrants’	   destination	   countries.	   It	   is	   therefore	   the	  responsibility	   of	  migrants	   to	   get	   in	   touch	  with	   home	   country	   authorities	   if	   they	  wish	   to	  vote.	   The	   way	   voter	   registers	   are	   constructed	   (from	   scratch,	   or	   based	   existing	   consular	  registries)	  is	  thus	  another	  element	  to	  consider.	  	  Despite	   comparably	   restrictive	   laws,	   Mexico	   and	   Bolivia	   have	   performed	   differently	   in	  registration	  figures	  in	  absolute	  terms	  (see	  table	  1).	  Not	  only	  does	  this	  data	  inform	  us	  that	  registration	  requirements	  are	  not	   the	  only	  variables	  to	  bear	   in	  mind,	   it	  also	  points	  out	   to	  the	   implementation	   of	   the	   existing	   procedures	   by	   electoral	   authorities	   as	   an	   element	  capable	  of	  influencing	  registration	  and	  turnout.	  	  	  Next	   to	   registration	   requirements,	   the	   electoral	   system	   is	   a	   second	   institutional	   variable	  underlined	  by	  Geys,	  which	  stresses	  the	  influence	  of	  majoritarian	  and	  proportional	  systems	  on	   voter	   turnout.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   external	   voter	   turnout,	   I	   however	  wish	   to	   broaden	   this	  category	  to	  electoral	  machinery	   focusing	  on	  three	  elements	  related	  to	  the	  access	  to	  voting	  rights	  abroad	  that	  my	  analysis	  points	  at.	  	  	  First,	  there	  is	  the	  type	  of	  election	  to	  which	  emigrants	  are	  invited	  to	  participate.	  The	  case	  of	  Italy	  where	  emigrants	  can	  vote	  at	  referenda	  and	  legislative	  elections	  clearly	  underlines	  the	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great	   interest	   of	   emigrants	   for	   legislative	   elections	   than	   for	   referenda	   on	   very	   specific	  issues	  that	  do	  not	  raise	  a	  lot	  of	  interest	  even	  among	  emigrant	  voters.	  Now,	  the	  cases	  studies	  included	  cases	  where	  migrants	  vote	  for	  legislative	  elections	  and	  presidential	  elections.	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  seat(s)	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  elections	  seems	  to	  deserve	  greater	  attention.	  While	  Presidential	  elections	  tend	  to	  diminish	  the	  migrants’	  capacity	  to	  influence	  a	  much	  greater	  pool	  of	  voters	  (therefore	  potentially	  influencing	  negatively	  turnout),	  presidents	  –as	  it	  was	  argued	   in	  Mexico	   -­‐	   represent	   the	  Nation	  abroad	  and	  are	   thus	  a	  prime	  political	   symbol	   to	  which	   emigrants	   could	   refer.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   legislative	   elections	   allow	   emigrants	   to	  have	   representatives	   in	   home	   countries	   that	   can	   be	   held	   accountable	   (especially	   in	   Italy	  where	  seats	  are	  reserved	  for	  emigrant	  MP’s	  and	  senators;	  see	  political	  variable).	  	  Second,	  the	  voting	  modality	  through	  which	  emigrants	  can	  express	  their	  vote	  is	  a	  variable	  to	  which	   attention	   should	   be	   paid	   to.	   While	   this	   variable	   does	   not	   necessarily	   affect	  registration,	   it	   certainly	  does	  affect	  actual	  participation	  after	   registration.	  Out	  of	   the	   four	  cases,	  Belgium	  is	  the	  only	  one	  to	  give	  several	  options	  to	  emigrants	  on	  how	  to	  cast	  their	  vote	  from	  abroad	  (NB.	  Italians	  abroad	  can	  come	  back	  to	  vote	  on	  the	  national	  territory	  if	  they	  ask	  in	  advance).	  Looking	  at	  Belgium	  in	  particular,	  we	  can	  actually	  determine	  that	  when	  voters	  are	   given	   the	   choice,	   they	   overwhelmingly	   chose	   to	   vote	   by	   mail	   (67.6%	   of	   all	   Belgian	  voters	  chose	  that	  modality	  in	  2003)	  over	  any	  other	  modality.	  Having	  to	  go	  to	  the	  consulate	  on	  Election	  Day	  (like	  Bolivians	  do)	  could	  unsurprisingly	  be	  a	  disincentive	  to	  register	  as	  an	  external	   voter.	   It	   may,	   however,	   not	   be	   a	   disincentive	   to	   vote	   once	   registered,	   as	   data	  indicates	  that	  turnout	  among	  emigrants	  voting	  in	  person	  at	  consulates	  is	  higher	  than	  those	  who	  choose	  to	  vote	  by	  mail	  (see	  table	  1).	  	  The	  third	  element	  is	  the	  obligation	  to	  vote,	  which	  has	  already	  been	  pointed	  out	  by	  Geys	  in	  his	   analysis.	   In	   the	   examples	  of	  Bolivia	   and	  Belgium,	   	  we	  have	  however	  underscored	   the	  technical	   difficulty	   to	   implement	   such	   rules	   abroad.	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this,	   electoral	  authorities	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly	   renounce	   to	   enforce	   this	   rule	   abroad.	   Nonetheless,	  interviews	   with	   voters	   declaring	   to	   be	   afraid	   of	   administrative	   complications	   with	   their	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home	  country	  if	  they	  do	  not	  vote	  seem	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  obligation	  to	  vote	  may	  play	  a	  part	  in	  voter	  turnout	  abroad	  as	  well.	  	  	  Table	  1.	  Voter	  turnout	  in	  Italy,	  Belgium,	  Mexico	  and	  Bolivia	  
Country	   Size	   of	   external	  
voters	   in	  
registry	  
N	   of	   actual	  
voters	  abroad	  




residents	  Italy	   2,707,382*	   1,053,864	   28.93%	   81.4%	  Mexico	   40,876	   32,632	   79.8%	   58.55%**	  Belgium	   114,677	   Not	  available	   87.64%	   (personal	   or	   proxy	  voters	  at	  consulate)	  65.95%	  (mail	  voters)	   91.9%	  Bolivia	   169,096	   125,101	   73,9%	   95,25%	  *	  automatic	  registration	  in	  place,	  **Including	  external	  voters.	  	  
4.2	  The	  political	  variables	  	  Under	   the	   political	   variables	   category,	   I	   chose	   to	   list	   different	   variables	   related	   to	   party	  politics	   and	   how	   they	   could	   potentially	   affect	   emigrant	   voter	   turnout.	   First,	   the	   political	  
culture	   in	  place	   in	   the	  home	  country	   should	  be	   looked	  at	   as	   a	   factor	   influencing	  external	  voter	   turnout.	   Just	   like	  Mexicans	   abroad	   did	   not	   demand	   external	   voting	  when	   elections	  where	  thought	  to	  be	  rigged,	  the	  influence	  on	  voter	  turnout	  of	  regimes	  in	  which	  elections	  do	  not	  present	  democratic	  guarantees	  should	  be	  examined.	  	  	  Second,	   instead	   of	   underling	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   closeness	   of	   an	   election,	   I	   prefer	   to	  stress	  the	  perceived	  importance	  of	  the	  election	  as	  a	  factor	  influencing	  turnout.	  Before	  they	  were	  granted	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  from	  abroad,	  Mexicans	  and	  Bolivians	  abroad	  already	  tended	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  home	  country	  politics	  as	  the	  coming	  elections	  was	  perceived	  to	  be	  crucial	   for	  the	  country’s	  democratic	  evolution	  (cf.	  Mexico	  2000	  and	  Bolivia	  2005).	   In	  that	  sense,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  election	  could	  contribute	  to	  regime	  change	  or	  substantial	  reforms	  –rather	  than	  elections	  closeness-­‐	  could	  prove	  a	  strong	  incentive.	  Looking	  at	  the	  MAS’s	  desire	  to	  get	  emigrants	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  change	  it	  tries	  to	  initiate	  in	  Bolivia,	  this	  certainly	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appears	  as	  an	   interesting	  variable.	  Similarly,	  Belgians	  who	  do	  not	  vote	   from	  abroad	  have	  admitted	  during	   interviews	   that	   if	   the	  unity	  of	   the	   federal	   state	  were	  at	   risk,	   they	  would	  register	  and	  vote.	  	  Third,	   the	   different	   dimensions	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   political	   parties	   abroad	   must	   also	   be	  looked	  at.	  This	  variable	  obviously	   includes	   the	  capacity	   to	  campaign	   and	  spend	  money	  on	  electoral	  advertising	  abroad	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  was	  prohibited	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Mexico.	  This	  left	  the	  burden	  of	  advertising	  about	  the	  coming	  Mexican	  presidential	  elections	  on	  the	  electoral	   authorities’	   shoulders.	  This	   is	   certainly	   all	   the	  more	   frustrating	   for	   the	  Mexican	  political	   parties	   that	   they	   already	   had	   structures	   in	   the	   United	   States	   before	   the	   2006	  elections.	   Italian	   parties,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   are	   allowed	   to	   do	   so	   but	   only	   the	   left-­‐wing	  coalition	  took	  this	  possibility	  seriously	  in	  2006.	  Campaigning	  abroad	  is	  certainly	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  external	  voting,	  as	  it	  implies	  costly	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  efforts	   to	  reach	  voters,	  who	  are	  sometimes	  disbursed	  throughout	  many	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  whom	  (despite	  the	  existence	  of	  electronic	  media)	  have	  often	  less	  access	  to	  political	   information	  about	  their	  home	  countries.	   	   In	  that	  sense,	  the	  connection	  of	  political	  
parties	  with	   sister	  political	  parties	   in	   emigrants’	   countries	  of	   residence	   can	  prove	  a	   crucial	  advantage.	   The	   Italian	   left-­‐wing	   coalition,	   again,	   benefited	   from	   the	   support	   of	   many	  socialist,	   social-­‐democratic	   and	   Green	   parties	   in	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   world	   before	   the	  2006	  elections.	  Similarly,	   Izquierda	  Unida	  in	  Spain	  encouraged	  Bolivian	  voters	  to	  register	  and	   vote	   for	   Morales.	   As	   we	   advise	   below	   to	   also	   look	   at	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   political	  context	  in	  which	  emigrants	  reside,	  this	  variable	  is	  certainly	  an	  additional	  one	  to	  look	  at.	  	  	  
4.3	  Demographic	  and	  socio-­economic	  variables	  	  Under	   the	   demographic	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   variables,	   I	   choose	   to	   list	   different	  characteristics	   of	   the	   emigrants’	   lives	   abroad	   as	   factors	   influencing	   the	   willingness	   to	  become	   involved	   in	   home	   country	   politics.	   The	   first	   two	   of	   these	   variables	   could	   have	  however	  also	  belonged	  to	  other	  categories	  of	  variables.	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  First,	   I	   perceive	   from	   the	   case	   studies	   that	   the	   distance	   that	   separates	   the	   voter	   from	   the	  
elected	   official	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   relevant	   indicator.	   I	   do	   not	   refer	   here	   to	   what	   Geys	   had	  underscored	   as	   the	   size	   of	   the	   electoral	   district,	  which	   tends	   to	   increase	   information	   on	  candidates	  and	  therefore	  turnout.	  Rather,	  I	  refer	  to	  a	  socio-­‐political	  variable	  that	  addresses	  the	   stake	   the	   emigrant	   has	   in	   the	   election	   (in	   that	   sense,	   it	   is	   close	   to	   the	   perceived	  
importance	  variable	   described	  above).	   I	  have	  already	  mentioned	   that	  different	   legislation	  on	  external	  voting	  makes	  votes	  cast	  abroad	  more	  or	  less	  decisive,	  according	  to	  the	  type	  of	  election.	  However,	   I	   have	  not	   yet	   touched	  upon	   the	   issue	  of	   reserved	   seats	   in	  Parliament,	  and	  how	  they	  affect	  turnout.	  The	  system	  in	  Italy,	  which	  combines	  reserved	  seats	  with	  the	  preferential	  vote,	  forces	  Italian	  candidates	  abroad	  to	  aggressively	  campaign	  among	  voters	  in	  electoral	  districts	  that	  are	  as	  big	  as	  one	  (or	  several)	  continent(s).	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Italian	   Constitution	   prohibits	   imperative	   mandates,	   the	   extra-­‐territorial	   constituency	  creates	  a	  strong	  connection	  between	  Italian	  emigrants,	  emigrants	  MPs	  and	  senators	  elected	  abroad.	  In	  other	  countries,	  such	  as	  Belgium,	  voters	  participate	  marginally	  in	  electing	  MP’s	  whose	   election	   largely	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   voters	   abroad.	   Comparing	   turnout	   between	  countries	  that	  have	  reserved	  seats	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not	  can	  help	  identify	  the	  influence	  of	  this	  factor.	  	  Second,	  while	  Geys	  has	  underscored	   the	   role	  of	  previous	   turnout	   in	   existing	   research	  on	  voter	   turnout,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   first	   time	   effect	   should	   be	   paid	   attention	   to	   in	   the	   case	   of	  external	  voting,	  as	  it	  has	  recently	  developed	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  to	  check	  for	  a	  potential	  increase	  in	  interest	  in	  voting	  from	  abroad	  when	  migrants	  have	  been	  prevented	   from	   doing	   so	   for	   a	   long	   time,	   or	   when	   the	   election	   in	   the	   home	   country	   is	  actually	  the	  first	  chance	  in	  their	  lifetime	  to	  participate	  in	  an	  election	  (e.g.	  because	  they	  left	  the	  home	  country	  before	  reaching	  the	  voting	  age	  and/or	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  voting	  rights	   in	   the	  country	  of	  residence).	  Opposing	   this	  view,	   the	  difficulty	  with	  which	  external	  voting	   legislation	   is	   often	   adopted	   (sometimes	   a	   few	  months	   before	   the	   election,	   like	   in	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Mexico	   and	  Bolivia)	   and	   the	   difficulty	   to	   inform	   emigrants	   on	   their	   newfound	   rights	   can	  also	  mean	  that	  first	  external	  voting	  experiences	  may	  mean	  lower	  turnout	  and	  registration.	  	  A	  third	  variable,	  the	  migration	  profile	  of	  individual	  migrants	  and	  communities,	  is	  of	  a	  much	  more	  general	  nature,	  and	  is	  in	  line	  with	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  variables	  of	  voter	  turnout.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  variable	  is	  particularly	  striking	  when	  assessing	  the	  differences	  in	  registration,	  voter	  turnout	  and	  electoral	  results	  of	  similar	  national	  groups	  of	  emigrants	  across	  different	  countries	  of	  residence.	  The	  differences	  in	  voter	  turnout	  among	  Italians	   in	   South	   America	   and	   Italians	   in	   Europe	   point	   to	   the	   specific	   characteristics	   of	  Italian	  communities	  over	  there,	  and	  the	  socio-­‐political	  context	  in	  which	  they	  live.	  Similarly,	  the	  fact	  that	  Bolivians	  in	  Spain	  who	  exceeded	  their	  registration	  target	  and	  split	  their	  vote	  between	   the	   two	   candidates	   prompts	   us	   to	   look	   at	   the	   specific	   characteristics	   of	   this	  population.	   Also,	   the	   fact	   that	   Mexicans	   proceeding	   from	   traditional	   migrant-­‐sending	  regions	   are	   under-­‐represented	   among	   voters,	   and	   that	   migrants	   residing	   in	   Europe	   are	  over-­‐represented	   in	   the	   voting	   population	   indicates	   that	   socio-­‐economic	   characteristics	  should	   be	   looked	   at	  when	   trying	   to	   explain	   external	   voter	   turnout.	   These	   characteristics	  obviously	   include:	   the	   levels	   of	   education,	   occupation	   and	   income	   that	   have	   traditionally	  been	   examined	   in	   turnout	   studies.	   Moreover,	   these	   examples	   also	   invite	   us	   to	   look	   at	  migration-­‐specific	  factors	  such	  as:	  timing	  of	  arrival,	  access	  to	  citizenship	  in	  the	  country	  of	  residence	  (and	  tolerance	  of	  migrants’	  linkages	  with	  the	  home	  country),	  and	  density	  of	  the	  migrant	   association’s	   network	   in	   the	   country	   of	   residence.	   These	   are	   just	   a	   few	   of	   the	  various	  migrant-­‐specific	  factors	  that	  my	  comparative	  analysis	  points	  to,	  and	  deserve	  to	  be	  looked	  at	  more	  closely	  with	  appropriate	  methods.	  	  	  
Conclusion:	  The	  “what,”	  the	  “how,”	  the	  “where,”	  and	  the	  “when”	  matter	  	  I	  started	  this	  paper	  by	  stating	  what	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  possible	  contradiction.	  One	  the	  one	   hand,	   external	   voting	   laws	   when	   implemented	   usually	   lead	   to	   low	   voter	   turnout	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abroad.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   states	   have	   implemented	   such	  legislation	   over	   the	   last	   decade.	   Looking	   at	   the	   existing	   literature	   in	   voter	   turnout	   and	  analyzing	   four	   countries	   that	   have	   implemented	   external	   voting	   in	   recent	   years,	   I	   have	  eventually	   come	   up	   with	   a	   list	   of	   variables	   to	   be	   assessed	   when	   analyzing	   registration,	  turnout,	  and	  results	  of	  elections	  that	  permit	  external	  voting.	  More	  generally,	  however,	  this	  paper	  proposes	  a	  comprehensive	  approach	  towards	  understanding	  electoral	  behavior	  from	  abroad.	  	  I	   have	   indeed	   clarified	   the	   importance	   of	   defining	  what	   is	  meant	   by	   voter	   turnout	  when	  analyzing	   external	   voting.	   I	   have	   repeatedly	   referred	   to	   registration	   levels	   and	   voter	  turnout	   as	   different	   indicators.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   latter,	   I	   have	   also	   indicated	   the	  ambiguities	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  analysis.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  ratios	  that	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  “voter	  turnout,”	  and	  these	  ratios	  take	  absolutely	  no	  consideration	  of	   the	   differences	   in	   registration	   procedures	   by	  which	   emigrants	   are	   able	   to	   vote.	   These	  inconsistencies	   strongly	   question	   the	   capacity	   of	   these	   indicators	   to	   reflect	   a	   general	  disinterest	  of	  emigrants	  to	  vote	  in	  home	  country	  elections.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  data	  on	  voter	  turnout	  (no	  matter	  how	  it	  is	  defined)	  is	  not	  always	  available,	  while	  different	  data	  on	  voter	  turnout	  is	  available	  in	  countries	  that	  allow	  external	  voting.	  This	  situation	  too	  makes	  comparisons	  very	  difficult.	  	  	  Comparing	   voter	   turnout	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   the	   success	   or	   failure	   of	   external	   voting	  experiments	   is	   a	   second	   issue	   that	   I	   have	   approached	   in	   the	   paper.	   Indeed,	   It	   appears	  indispensible	   if	   we	   wish	   to	   isolate	   variables	   that	   affect	   voter	   turnout.	   	   But	   how	   can	   we	  compare	  turnout	  when	  laws	  are	  so	  different	  from	  one	  country	  to	  the	  next?	  One	  important	  conclusion	   of	   this	   paper	   is	   to	   argue	   in	   a	   similar	   line	   to	  Waldinger	   and	   Fitzgerald	   (2004:	  1191)	   that,	   when	   for	   political	   as	   for	   other	   transnational	   practices,	   “within-­‐group	  comparisons	  across	  different	  national	   incorporation	  systems”	  are	  necessary.	  The	  cases	  of	  Mexico,	   Italy	   and	   particularly	   Bolivia	   have	   all	   revealed	   differences	   in	   registration	   and	  turnout	   according	   to	   countries	   of	   residence.	   These	   kinds	   of	   comparisons	   allow	   for	   the	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neutralization	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  registration	  requirements	  (and	  the	  law	  in	  general)	  to	  see	  how	  other	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  factors	  might	  be	  at	  play.	  	  On	   a	   final	   note,	   this	   paper	   has	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   taking	   into	   consideration	   the	  political	   context	   in	  which	   external	   voting	   legislation	   is	   adopted	   to	   understand	   variations	  voter	   turnout.	   The	   extension	   of	   the	   electorate	   is	   indeed	   never	   a	   politically	   neutral	   issue.	  When	  the	  political	  relevance	  of	  external	  voting	  is	  considered,	  voter	  turnout	  is	  not	  the	  only	  indicator	  that	  should	  be	  evaluated.	  A	  recurring	  fear	  among	  opponents	  to	  external	  voting	  is	  that	   voters	   abroad	   could	   cast	   the	   decisive	   votes	   in	   an	   election.	   The	   case	   of	   Italy	   was	  certainly	   presented	   as	   such,	   even	   though	   the	   senators	   elected	   in	   Piedmont	   weighed	   as	  much	   as	   the	   one	   elected	   in	   South	  America.	  However,	   the	   supposed	   decisive	   character	   of	  external	  voters	  very	  much	  depends	  on	  when	  and	  where	  their	  votes	  are	  counted.	  Had	  votes	  in	  Italy	  be	  counted	  in	  Italy	  before	  others,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  presented	  as	  decisive	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	   count.	   Similarly,	   counting	  emigrant	  votes	  along	  with	   residents’	  votes	  in	  the	  same	  electoral	  district,	  like	  in	  Belgium,	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  attract	  the	  same	  level	  of	  attention	  that	  the	  extra-­‐territorial	  constituency	  has	  attracted	  in	  Italy.	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